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Abstract
In attempting to understand the effectiveness of the Security and Exchange Commission’s
(”SEC”) Memoranda of Understanding (”MOU”), this Note proceeds in three parts. Part I exam-
ines the structure of the global marketplace and evaluates the prospects for cooperation. Part II
looks at the U.S. court system’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction and reviews some repre-
sentative MOUs. Part III concludes that MOUs are primed for success as an information exchange
framework, though an evaluation of their effectiveness should be carried out by the SEC or another
body with access to confidential files obtained from foreign regulators.
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
brought billionaire Allen Stanford to trial for investor fraud.1 
Although he surrendered to federal law enforcement within the 
United States,2 his influence abroad could have been an 
unfortunate frustration for the SEC.3 As a financier, Stanford 
controlled banks across the Caribbean and Latin America.4 But it 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. Economics, 
Politics, 2008, New York University. The author would like to thank Professors Steven 
Thel and Eric Jensen for their input and advice, and his family for encouraging him to 
pursue a legal education. 
1. See Clifford Krauss et al., Texas Firm Accused of $8 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 2009, at A1 (“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission, in a civil suit, said Mr. 
Stanford and two colleagues fraudulently peddled to scores of investors.”); Graeme 
Wearden, Allen Stanford Indicted on Fraud Charges After Surrendering to FBI, GUARDIAN 
(London), June 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/19/allen-
stanford-arrested (“In February, [the SEC] . . . alleged that he fraudulently sold $8bn 
(£4.7bn) in certificates . . . .”). 
2. See Wearden, supra note 1 (“Stanford, 59, had been staying at his girlfriend’s 
home in Fredericksburg, 50 miles south of Washington, but left the premises to speak 
with FBI agents who were parked outside, according to his lawyer.”); see also Zachary A. 
Goldfarb & Anita Kumar, Stanford, 5 Associates Charged With Running $7 Billion Ponzi 
Scheme, WASH. POST, June 20, 2009, at A11 (“Stanford, 59, surrendered to FBI agents at 
his girlfriend’s house in Fredericksburg, Va., Thursday night.”). 
3. See Krauss et al., supra note 1 (“On the tiny island of Antigua, Mr. Stanford’s 
presence was both large and controversial”); see also Tom Leonard, An Island Bowled over 
by a Master of Spin; Sir Allen Stanford’s Lavish Spending Turned Antigua into His Very Own 
Theme Park, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 21, 2009, at 23 (“The sums of money the 
Texan was willing to splash around would have caused ripples even in a rich country, but 
on an island of 70,000 people the Allen Stanford largesse crashed over like a tidal 
wave.”). 
4. See Daniel Cancel & Matthew Walter, Venezuela takes over Local Bank Owned by 
Stanford, CARIBBEAN NET NEWS, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/
venezuela/venezuela.php?news_id=14384&start=0&category_id=12 (“In addition to 
Venezuela, Stanford operated affiliates in Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and 
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was in Antigua, Stanford’s adopted home, where his influence 
was at its peak. 
The island had a gross domestic product smaller than 
Stanford’s personal fortune.5 He poured money into both the 
island’s development and, correspondingly, the government’s 
pockets.6 In response, the Antiguan government knighted 
Stanford.7 His alleged bribes of Antiguan financial regulators8 
may yet hamper the SEC’s efforts to extract evidence and 
information from Antiguan control. For example, the head of 
Antigua’s regulator already attempted to throw the SEC off of its 
investigation of Stanford before his arrest.9 
Potential difficulties in discovering and investigating 
misconduct abroad are well illustrated, though perhaps at an 
extreme, by Stanford’s situation. The SEC has to deal with these 
and other complexities that hamper effective cooperation when 
investigating transnational transgressions. In response, the 
 
Panama . . . .”); Profile: Allen Stanford, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 2008, at 21 
(“Allen opened offices in Latin America and the Caribbean.”). 
5. See Jenny Booth & Hannah Strange, Allen Stanford Fraud Charges Trigger Panic 
and Run on His Banks, TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5760612.ece (discussing Stanford as the largest 
employer and investor in Antigua and the possible catastrophic effects of the charges 
against him); Profile: Allen Stanford, supra note 4 (stating that Stanford’s “[US]$2.2 
billion (£1.4 billion) fortune . . . dwarfs the GDP of Antigua and Barbuda.”). 
6. See Goldfarb & Kumar, supra note 2 (discussing Stanford’s extensive holdings in 
Antigua); Leonard, supra note 3; see also Jacqueline Charles, Billionaire Stanford’s Troubles 
Cause a Tropical Headache on Antigua, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing 
Stanford’s celebrity status, donations and sponsorships, and his knighthood granted by 
Antigua). 
7. See Leonard, supra note 3 (“After he took dual US and Antiguan-Barbudan 
citizenship, the islands gave him a knighthood.”); Krauss et al., supra note 1. 
8. See Goldfarb & Kumar, supra note 2 (stating that bribes to the Antiguan 
regulator were both cash and in-kind); Krauss et al., supra note 1 (“[Stanford] was 
viewed by many as cozying up with key politicians to win their favor.”); Robert Khuzami, 
Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Statement at News 
Conference Announcing Additional Charges in Stanford Ponzi Scheme Case (June 19, 
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061909rk.htm [hereinafter 
Khuzami Speech] (stating that the Antiguan regulator was “bought and paid for [by 
Stanford] with bribes and corruption”). 
9. See Goldfarb & Kumar, supra note 2 (“The indictment charges that [the 
Antiguan regulator] gave confidential information about an SEC inquiry to Stanford, 
which enabled him to deceive the SEC about the bank’s finances and the level of 
oversight conducted by Antiguan authorities.”); Khuzami Speech, supra note 8 (stating 
that the Antiguan regulator’s assurances to the SEC “were just more Stanford lies, 
dressed-up in the letterhead of a supposedly impartial bank regulator who had in fact 
been bought and paid for with bribes and corruption”). 
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agency has been signing informal Memoranda of Understanding 
(“MOU”) with foreign regulators for over two decades in an 
attempt to circumvent barriers to international cooperation and 
information sharing.10 
These agreements are more important now than ever 
before. Markets across the globe are rising to challenge U.S. 
financial supremacy,11 providing increasing opportunities for 
U.S. citizens to be defrauded abroad and for U.S. firms to engage 
in misconduct supposedly beyond the SEC’s ability to 
meaningfully scrutinize.12 MOUs partake in the solution to this 
problem by expanding the SEC’s ability to investigate 
internationally. They do this by providing a fundamental 
framework for interactions between two regulators, allowing 
them to request information pursuant to a mutually determined 
procedure and anticipate cooperation in return.13 Alternatively 
stated, the SEC can obtain information about misconduct outside 
the United States through MOUs concluded with regulators that 
have jurisdictional access to the desired information.14 
Accordingly, MOUs appear to effectively promote investigatory 
cooperation,15 though confidentiality provisions surrounding the 
documents limit meaningful study.16 
The agreements are a response to changing conditions in 
the global financial marketplace.17 MOUs may also represent one 
facet of an effort by the United States to counter its slip from 
dominance.18 As a tool to promote information-gathering 
 
10. See infra notes 200–204 and accompanying text (discussing the background of 
Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”)). 
11. See infra Part I.B (reviewing current conditions in global financial markets). 
12. See infra Part I.B (reviewing current conditions in global financial markets). 
13. See infra Part II.C (discussing MOUs as cooperative frameworks). 
14. See infra Part II.B (discussing MOUs’ structure and provisions). 
15. See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing elements of MOUs that make them effective). 
16. See infra Part III.C (discussing confidentiality provisions applicable to MOUs). 
17. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s 
acknowledgment of the need for international cooperation and that the SEC has been 
attempting to improve its regulatory regime). 
18. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing SEC’s 
acknowledgment of the need for international cooperation and that the SEC has been 
attempting to improve its regulatory regime); infra Part I.B.2–4 (discussing U.S. 
competitiveness and regulations). 
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cooperation, MOUs mitigate some of the factors harming U.S. 
competitiveness within capital markets.19 
In attempting to discover and understand the effectiveness 
of the SEC’s MOUs, this Note will proceed in three Parts. Part I 
examines the structure of the global marketplace and evaluates 
the prospects for cooperation. Part II looks at the U.S. court 
system’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction and reviews 
some representative MOUs. Part III concludes that MOUs are 
primed for success as an information exchange framework, 
though an evaluation of their effectiveness should be carried out 
by the SEC or another body with access to confidential files 
obtained from foreign regulators. 
I. MARKET TRENDS AND STRUCTURE 
From an unchallenged, post-World War II high as the 
preeminent global financial leader, the United States’ status is, 
and has been, under threat from several rising competitor 
financial centers. The erosion of U.S. dominance in global 
capital-raising is an inevitable result of the development of other 
states, including the departure of Europe from the U.S. financial 
umbrella.20 Although this trend has been clear since the 1980s, 
some potential to retard or reverse it lies in international 
enforcement cooperation, particularly as markets—and more 
importantly their effects—become progressively transnational.21 
Prospects for international cooperation in securities 
regulation are affected by the growing number and importance 
of non-U.S. actors and the variations between their securities 
laws.22 Although harmonizing all states’ securities laws would 
smooth out differences between relevant jurisdictions, no 
consensus or constituency exists for such an undertaking.23 
Instead, less formal arrangements, such as the SEC’s MOUs, are 
more plausible mechanisms for promoting international 
securities enforcement cooperation.24 
 
19. See infra Part II.B (describing MOU provisions that open up new sources of 
enforcement information for the SEC). 
20. See infra Part I.A (discussing historical changes in global financial markets). 
21. See id. 
22. See infra Parts I.A–B (reviewing current conditions in global financial markets 
and how they have changed). 
23. See infra notes 210–214 and accompanying text (discussing MOUs as soft law). 
24. See id. 
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In order to better understand the environment within which 
MOUs are operating and to which they are structured to 
respond, Part 1.A presents a brief historical overview of 
international financial developments. Part I.B then examines 
current conditions in the global marketplace, including U.S. 
competitiveness, and looks at the International Organization for 
Securities Commissions. Finally, Part I.C discusses the feasibility 
of international cooperation within this environment. 
A. Historical Overview 
 After World War I, the United States, even as a major global 
power, passed on the opportunity to influence the post-war 
global structure, but it had a second opportunity to take the lead 
in creating a new comprehensive global system after World War 
II.25 In 1945, the ravages of war left the other advanced and 
potential competitor states physically destroyed and struggling to 
rebuild their exhausted economies, while U.S. territory remained 
unscathed.26 
  U.S. leadership manifested itself in the creation of a new, 
formalized global economic order: the Bretton Woods system.27 
 
25. See Colum Gavan Duffy, The League of Nations, 78 THE IRISH MONTHLY 166, 173–
74 (1950) (“[I]f the United States had not refused to become a member of the League 
of Nations from the beginning, it is possible that . . . this great international experiment 
would have been more successful . . . .”); Barry Eichengreen & Peter B. Kenen, 
Managing the World Economy Under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview, in MANAGING 
THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 3, 9 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 
1994) (“The failure of . . . initiatives can be attributed to a combination of 
circumstances, prominent among which was the recalcitrance of the United States.”). By 
declining to cooperate, the United States largely condemned to failure efforts at 
structuring international interaction by the European powers. See Duffy, supra; 
Eichengreen & Kenen, supra. 
26. See Donald C. Langevoort, Foreword: United States Securities Regulation and Global 
Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 194 (2008) (discussing U.S. advantages compared 
to Europe and Japan after World War II); Raymond Vernon, The United States Government 
at Bretton Woods and After, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND 
PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 52, 58 (Orin Kirschner ed., 1996) (explaining the United 
States’ formidable economic might after World War II). 
27. See ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM 
286 (1978) (stating that by the end of 1945, thirty-four nations had ratified the Bretton 
Woods agreements); Rolf W. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New Design for 
International Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 391 (2007) (discussing the 
vision for Bretton Woods to “redevelop and reintegrate”the world economy). The 
Bretton Woods system was strongly shaped by U.S. preferences. See VAN DORMAEL, supra 
at 29–95 (discussing how the implementation and structure of Bretton Woods was 
altered by the United States by using “bulldozer tactics,” locating the IMF and World 
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Bretton Woods was conceived as a series of international 
organizations and agreements to promote international financial 
and commercial cooperation and stability.28 With the 
establishment of Bretton Woods, the United States maneuvered 
itself into the center of the new world order—politically, 
geographically, and, most importantly, financially. The Bretton 
Woods system focused on domestic restrictions. States’ currencies 
were tied to the U.S. dollar at fixed rates in order to promote 
financial stability.29 These and other domestic restrictions were 
expected to produce the desired international commercial 
stability, overseen by the international organizations constituting 
Bretton Woods system.30 As international finance grew in 
importance and complexity throughout the decades following 
the war, Bretton Woods was increasingly stressed. The system, 
however, was designed with enough flexibility to adapt to 
changing conditions and maintain itself.31 It survives today, in 
part, through the International Monetary Fund. 
Through this time, the United States’ economic dominance 
has slipped, though it still commands an impressive share of 
global capital-raising income.32 These troubles are partly the 
 
Bank in Washington, D.C. and detailing a “personal decision” by the U.S. Treasury 
Secretary to preempt the desires of a majority of Bretton Woods delegations); see also 
Vernon, supra note 26 (explaining the wide array of options for the United States to 
achieve through its economic muscle). 
28. See Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Bretton Woods and International Cooperation, 23 
FOREIGN AFF. 182, 182 (1945) (“For [Bretton Woods] took the first, the most vital and 
the most difficult step toward putting into effect the sort of international economic 
program which will be necessary for preserving the peace and creating favorable 
conditions for world prosperity.”); John W. Pehle, The Bretton Woods Institutions, 55 YALE 
L.J. 1127, 1129 (1946) (stating that one of the goals of Bretton Woods was to “reduce 
obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous 
international commercial relations”). 
29. See Weber & Arner, supra note 27, at 395 (“The essential underlying theory . . . 
was based, first, on a system of stable exchange rates.”); Eichengreen & Kenen, supra 
note 25, at 13 (“[M]embers of the IMF were required to peg their currencies to gold or 
to the dollar (which was pegged to gold at [US]$35 an ounce).”). 
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
31. See Weber & Arner, supra note 27, at 391 (“While international finance began 
to reemerge soon after World War II . . . , due to the Bretton Woods’ focus on fixed 
exchange rates . . . , there were no corresponding efforts directed towards its regulation, 
leaving the matter to domestic law.”); see also Eichengreen & Kenen, supra note 25, at 4 
(“[T]he postwar institutional order was not just sturdy but remarkably adaptable. It was 
sufficiently flexible to cope with unanticipated events and rectify mistakes . . . .”). 
32. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 29 (2006), available at 
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result of newly-risen competitor financial centers attracting some 
of the United States’ global share of capital-raising. Competitor 
markets have been restructuring and rebranding themselves into 
globally appealing entities.33 For example, the European Union 
(“EU”) has implemented the Financial Services Action Plan 
(“FSAP”), which attempts to reduce regulatory costs for investors 
by harmonizing securities law across Europe.34 The change in 
global finance can be characterized simply: companies looking to 
raise capital now have a meaningful choice when deciding which 
state’s financial system is best suited for their needs.35 In the past 
they would have had only one feasible option: to come to the 
United States.36 
But blame for the United States’ relative decline does not lie 
solely in other jurisdictions. Although it would have been 
unrealistic to expect the United States to maintain indefinitely 
such a disproportionate and uncontested lead in global finance, 
certain aspects of the U.S. finance industry have accelerated its 
slip.37 Fundamentally, the U.S. financial market is no longer 
 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf 
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT] (showing the decline of capital raised in the United 
States); Ingo Walter, Financial Integration Across Borders and Across Sectors: Implications for 
Regulatory Structures, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE 15, 46 (Jereon J.M. Kremers 
et al. eds., 2003) (identifying “the current US market share as roughly 65 per cent in 
global capital-raising and corporate advisory revenues”). 
33. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 39–41 (discussing changes in competitor 
markets such as “an increase in the integrity of and trust in major foreign public markets 
resulting from more transparency and better disclosure”); see also Walter, supra note 32, 
at 42–43 (explaining that Europe makes less distinction between financial firms and is 
more unified within national systems). 
34. See Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law after the 
Financial Services Action Plan?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 43–44, 74 (2008) (discussing 
FSAP and its uniformity goals); European Commission, Financial Services: Implementing 
the Framework for Financial Markets, at 3, COM (1999) 232 Final (May 1999), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf 
(1999) [hereinafter FSAP] (discussing the European move to a single market and 
FSAP’s goals within that framework). 
35. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 193 (citing Dubai, London, and Hong Kong as 
examples of New York’s competitors); see also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at x–xi 
(describing the difference between the past and current options of capital raising firms). 
36. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“The United States Public Equity 
Market is Losing Competitiveness to Foreign and Private Markets[.]”); see also 
Langevoort, supra note 26, at 193 (“[C]apital market transactions are increasingly based 
in London, Hong Kong or Dubai, rather than in New York.”). 
37. See discussion infra notes 39–43 (discussing the importance of retail investors in 
the United States). 
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dominant enough to draw undivided attention in spite of 
regulation more cumbersome than that of its competitors.38 
The U.S. investment market is comprised to a unique 
degree of individual investors, known as retail investors.39 These 
small and unsophisticated participants have pushed for a 
different approach to regulation in order to protect themselves.40 
As a result of this popular participation, the U.S. regulatory 
regime is much more prone to overreaction in response to 
financial downturns, as elected officials respond to their 
constituent investors’ fury.41 Widespread financial market 
participation often acts to push the U.S. government, acting to 
protect relatively unsophisticated investors, away from the level of 
regulation that would best attract firms to the United States.42 
The end result is that other states see the U.S. system as a 
labyrinth of high costs.43 
 
38. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 196 (“[T]he United States no longer has rents 
that can compensate for—and thus mask—any suboptimal regulation.”); see also 
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at x–xi (“U.S. financial markets need to attract business 
that has a choice, and therefore how our markets are regulated by rules and laws really 
does matter today.”). 
39. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 204 (“But globally, few if any other countries 
have a similarly retail-driven approach.”); see also Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A 
Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 31, 41 (2007) (“Today, more than half of all U.S. households are invested in 
the stock market, either directly or through mutual funds and pension schemes.”). 
40. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 204 (“U.S. securities regulation truly is in a 
bind. It has been built over the last seventy-five years largely to promote the interests of 
retail investors, and the political demand for regulatory responses after every scandal 
reminds us of this.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025–26 (2009) 
(discussing the SEC’s historical focus on the need to protect retail investors). 
41. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 204 (“The common theme is relatively easy to 
spot. U.S. securities regulation truly is in a bind. It has been built over the last seventy-
five years largely to promote the interests of retail investors, and the political demand 
for regulatory responses after every scandal reminds us of this.”); Langevoort, supra note 
40, at 1025–26 (explaining how SEC rule making can be driven by popular outcry in 
response to scandals and crashes). 
42. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 192, 204 (“[A] demand for tough, intense 
regulation has been persistent for most of the past decade . . . .”); see also Walter, supra 
note 32, at 46 (discussing problems of overregulation and underregulation). 
43. See Walter, supra note 32, at 41 (“Regulation in the USA is carried out through 
a crazy quilt of agencies . . . .”); see also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at x–xi (“U.S. 
financial markets need to attract business that has a choice, and therefore how our 
markets are regulated by rules and laws really does matter today.” (emphasis added)). 
Interestingly, other nations are beginning to follow the U.S. lead of securities ownership 
by individuals, as opposed to large institutional investors, indicating a possible future 
change in regulatory attitudes and priorities. See Luigi Guiso et al., Household Stockholding 
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But this does not all lead to a foregone conclusion. The 
United States may yet recapture definitive control of the global 
conversation about international finance; there currently exists a 
dearth of clear leadership in transnational securities 
enforcement.44 Perhaps in response, SEC Chairman Mary 
Schapiro, in an address to the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), emphasized that the SEC is 
attempting to become a more effective securities regulator within 
the global system.45 But in a nod to the rise in importance of 
other regions, she acknowledged the need for regulators to work 
together in meeting the challenges created by the ever-increasing 
internationalization of finance markets.46 The United States has 
been building momentum to find ways to make securities 
regulation and enforcement more effective at home and, more 
relevantly, abroad.47 
 
in Europe: Where Do We Stand and Where Do We Go?, 18 ECON. POL’Y 123, 125 (2003) (“[A] 
much larger proportion of [European] investors now hold stocks in their portfolio.”); 
Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 41 (“[T]rends in Europe and elsewhere follow this 
[U.S.] pattern, with retail investors more willing than in the past to put their savings into 
the capital market, rather than in safer but comparatively low-return bank savings 
accounts.”). 
44. See C. Fred Bergsten, Managing the World Economy of the Future, in MANAGING 
THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 341, 349 (Peter B. Kenen 
ed., 1994) (“Filling the present leadership vacuum is one of the most crucial challenges 
facing the system as it enters the 21st century.”); Joseph A. Greenwald, Regionalism, 
Multilateralism, and American Leadership, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: 
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS, supra note 26, at 270, 281 (“No single 
power or group of countries has moved up to take the place of the United States.”). 
45. See Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman at 34th Annual 
IOSCO [Int’l Org. of Securities Comm’ns] Conference: Improving the Role of the 
Securities Regulators in a Changing Global Financial System (June 11, 2009), available at 
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061109mls.htm [hereinafter Schapiro Speech] 
(“You might say that, in the U.S., we are attempting to do exactly what this panel is 
slated to discuss: ‘Improving the Role of [a] Securities Regulator in a Changing Global 
Financial System.’”). 
46. See id. (discussing the interconnectedness of markets and the new importance 
of international securities enforcement). 
47. See Margaret E. Tahyar, Final Report of the Securities Law Subcommittee of the Task 
Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the International Bar Association, 2009 PLI/CORP. L. & 
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 685, 701 (“For the first time, the United States has 
expressed a serious willingness to explore alternatives to a nationally based securities 
regulatory regime in favour of greater coordination with foreign regulators . . . .”); see 
also Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692, 1711 
(2008) (“The SEC can no longer take a unilateralist approach to securities regulation 
and assume the U.S. markets will remain the premier capital markets.”). 
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Challenges to coordination in securities regulation and 
enforcement may be overcome by favoring less formalized 
arrangements. The structure of the U.S. government, namely its 
separation of powers, makes it difficult for the United States to 
credibly commit itself to binding agreements and initiatives.48 
These same structural problems threatened U.S. success and 
participation in the Bretton Woods negotiations and remain 
relevant today in international cooperation efforts.49 Binding 
arrangements, however, may not be necessary to secure 
meaningful coordination in the field of securities enforcement.50 
Non-enforceable alternatives, such as MOUs, may sidestep 
constitutional and other internal agreement-approval processes. 
B. Current Conditions 
Major financial markets today have significant international 
participation. For example, in 2005 the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”) had a total capitalization of US$21 trillion 
dollars, of which over a third came from foreign firms.51 This 
percentage has increased over the last few decades, illustrating 
 
48. See H. Bockleman, The Need for Worldwide Coordination of Economic Policies, in 
FINANCING THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE NINETIES 39, 46 (Jac J. Sijben ed., 1989) 
(explaining that the “constitutional role of Congress” impairs the ability of the United 
States to commit itself); Vernon, supra note 26, at 52–53 (explaining that the structure 
of U.S. government encourages the promulgation of ideas, but also that these ideas must 
run a gauntlet of checks and balances). 
49. See Bockleman, supra note 48, at 46; Vernon, supra note 26, at 52–53 (“The 
Bretton Woods agreement itself was a race against declining U.S. public opinion and 
against possible rejection by Congress”); VAN DORMAEL, supra note 27, at 286 (observing 
that Congressional approval required the “most high-powered propaganda campaign in
. . . history”); see also John S. Odell, From London to Bretton Woods; Sources of Change in 
Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes, 8 J. OF PUB. POL’Y 287, 303–04 (1988) (discussing the 
careful considerations that went into securing approval of Bretton Woods in the United 
States, including “a stunning national campaign to ‘stimulate public interest, crystallize 
public opinion, and make that opinion vocal.’”). 
50. See infra Part II.B (discussing the advantages of soft law arrangements). 
51. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 34 (“In terms of market capitalization, 
these 450 foreign private issuers had a total market capitalization of $7.9 trillion at the 
end of 2005, or 37% of the NYSE’s total $21.2 trillion market capitalization.”); Letter 
from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 
(Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71205/myeager031006.pdf 
(“Currently, there are 453 foreign companies from 47 countries listed on the NYSE . . . 
represent[ing] over 37% of the total market value of NYSE-listed companies and over $8 
trillion in total global market capitalization.”). 
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the accelerating international focus of global financial markets.52 
Correspondingly, U.S. retail investors now go abroad in 
increasing numbers for their investment needs, in part due to 
U.S. markets’ loss of global competitiveness and considerable 
opportunities to invest abroad.53 
But serious problems with and challenges to the 
internationalization of financial markets exist. Retail investors 
can face significant costs in dealing with foreign markets, notably 
due to the need for different brokering arrangements for each 
jurisdiction within which the investors operate.54 National 
domestic rules may also impose large burdens on firms 
attempting to comply with the rules of multiple regulators.55 In 
addition, the same technological advances helping to drive 
markets towards global reach also make fraud easier and cheaper 
to perpetrate from ostensibly outside the reach of the victims’ 
regulators and governments.56 Finally, as more competitor 
 
52. See John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1771 
tbl. 1 (2002) (graphically showing the increase in percentage of foreign listings over 
time); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 34 (noting that the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”) was domestically focused historically, but now is significantly 
international). 
53. See Karmel, supra note 47, at 1711 (“U.S. investors are buying foreign securities 
in record numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make offerings in 
the U.S. to raise capital.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 48 (noting that “over the 
past two years, U.S. retail investment abroad has surged dramatically”); see also Tahyar, 
supra note 47, at 699–700 (“The current challenge for national securities regulators and 
national legislators is how to reshape and modernise their national securities regulatory 
systems, which were conceived at a time when markets were primarily local, to be helpful 
to investors (both retail and institutional) and regulated actors already functioning on a 
global level.”). 
54. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 699 (“[M]ost national systems make it burdensome 
and costly for retail investors to invest in foreign securities.”); see also George W. 
Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to a Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to 
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 101–02 (2007) 
(“Retail investors currently face high barriers, such as having to use foreign broker 
affiliates and facing multiple layers of fees, that make direct investment abroad difficult, 
although not impossible.”). 
55. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 706 (stating that barriers can exist even if legal 
rules across borders are consistent); see also Walter, supra note 32, at 41 (discussing the 
different approach and complicated structure of U.S. regulation). 
56. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 35 (“Technology and globalization have 
also created new opportunities for securities fraud.”); see also THE INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, REPORT ON SECURITIES ACTIVITY ON THE 
INTERNET III 32–33 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/
finance/securities_capital_markets/IOSCOPD159.pdf (explaining the huge 
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financial markets emerge and gain strength, they are at risk of 
engaging in a race to the bottom—attempting to capture more 
firms and capital through progressively permissive regulatory 
standards.57 
Alternatively, competition between different states’ financial 
centers may bring some advantages to the global financial system. 
The struggle for capital-raising income may lead to better 
oversight coupled with lower costs through regulatory 
innovation, which would be to the benefit of all market 
participants.58 Additionally, firms may choose to signal their 
reliability to investors by choosing a more stringent regulatory 
jurisdiction.59 
In this environment, states face an important choice of how 
to structure their regulatory regime. The challenge for 
regulators, as it has always been, is to balance compliance costs 
with investor confidence.60 The regulator able to reformulate its 
 
informational burdens investors face, even in light of vast informational access through 
the internet); Schapiro Speech, supra note 45 (describing the interconnectedness of 
financial markets and new challenges); Press Release, International Organization of 
Securities Commissioners, IOSCO Welcomes 50th Signatory in Fight against Cross 
Border Market Misconduct, IOSCO/MR/07/2009 (Mar. 31, 2009), available at 
http://iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS141.pdf (“The success of the MMOU 
represents a commitment by securities regulators, and their governments, to work 
together to intensify investor protection and to combat the threat to market integrity 
posed by the increasing occurrence of cross border market misconduct.”). 
57. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at xi (“A regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ will 
serve no useful competitive purpose.”); see also Tahyar, supra note 47, at 705 (“Will the 
inevitable competition in a world of several financial centres create a regulatory race to 
the bottom?”). 
58. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 52 (“[H]ealthy regulatory competition 
exists when different regulators share the same overarching regulatory objectives, but, in 
implementing comparable regimes, compete with each other to develop the most 
effective and least costly ways to achieve these goals.”); see also Stravos Gadinis, The 
Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 492 
(2008) (“The dominant center may engage in a race to the top or to the bottom against 
its competitor to attract more investors from third countries.”). 
59. See Bo Harvey, Exchange Consolidation and Models of International Securities 
Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 161 (2007) (“Having several competing 
regimes can provide a useful signaling device to regulators, as companies choose to issue 
securities where regulation is neither overly burdensome nor so light that investors 
require a higher return on their investments to compensate them for additional risk.”); 
Ariel Yehezkel, Foreign Corporations Listing in the United States: Does Law Matter? Testing the 
Israeli Phenomenon, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 351, 358 (2006) (stating considerations for firms 
when choosing where to list, including the signaling function to investors). 
60. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at xi (explaining that a regulator must 
“manag[e] regulatory costs and burdens while maintaining the confidence of 
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rules to balance these factors more successfully can pull ahead of 
other competitors in capturing new global capital.61 London’s 
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), discussed below, is 
generally regarded as having done so.62 
1. IOSCO 
The International Organization for Securities Commissions 
is a loose international organization consisting solely of securities 
regulators.63 An individual securities regulator achieves 
membership through direct application, without any necessary 
intervention by other governmental organs.64 As of March 2010, 
 
investors”); Tahyar, supra note 47, at 699 (“[T]he goals of effective regulation of 
securities offerings are to balance investor protection against the benefits of capital 
formation . . . .”); SEC, 2004–2009 STRATEGIC PLAN 30, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/secstratplan0409.pdf [hereinafter SEC STRATEGIC PLAN] (“By providing a 
formalized structure and government oversight, [U.S. securities] laws carefully balance 
the desire for open, accessible, and competitive markets with the need to protect 
investors.”). 
61. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 192 (“[R]eports have criticized U.S. securities 
regulation for being unduly cumbersome, and, in part, blamed overregulation for a loss 
of competitiveness . . . .”); see also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at xi (“Investors and 
companies raising capital participate in markets where they feel safe by virtue of effective 
laws and rules vigorously enforced by knowledgeable, transparent courts and even-
handed, vigilant regulators.”). The internal organizational structure of regulators, 
however, has not been shown to be meaningfully correlated to potential effectiveness. 
See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 710–11 (“[A]cademic research to date has found little 
difference in the quality of financial market oversight in jurisdictions that have 
consolidated their financial regulation into unitary agencies . . . as compared to the 
more traditional divisions of authority found in the United States.”); see also Martin 
Cihak & Richard Podpiera, Is One Watchdog Better Than Three? International Experience 
with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 57, 
2006), available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0657.pdf 
(“[I]ntegrated supervision is generally associated with higher quality and consistency of 
supervision across supervised institutions, even though a large part of the difference is 
explained by other variables, mainly income level . . . .”). 
62. See discussion, infra notes 90–93 (discussing the Financial Services Authority 
(“FSA”)). 
63. See About IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) 
[hereinafter About IOSCO] (stating the objectives of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”)). 
64. See About IOSCO, Membership Categories and Criteria, http://iosco.org/
about/index.cfm?section=membership (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) [hereinafter IOSCO 
Membership] (discussing IOSCO membership requirements); see also Pamela Jimenez, 
International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act and Memoranda of Understanding, 31 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 295, 306 (1990) (“[An] MOU need not be formally ratified by the 
United States Senate and the corresponding body in the foreign jurisdiction . . . .” 
(quoting Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities 
Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 374, 435 (1987))). The SEC had been signing MOUs for 
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IOSCO has 193 members, including national and provincial-level 
regulators.65 IOSCO principally serves as a forum for regulators 
to discuss differences and, ideally, work out cooperation 
agreements.66 To this end, one of IOSCO’s primary drives has 
been to engage regulators to harmonize their principles of 
regulation and disclosure rules.67 
IOSCO requires most participating regulators to sign the 
IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MMOU”) as a condition of joining.68 As the document itself 
states, IOSCO designed the MMOU to facilitate “mutual 
assistance and the exchange of information” between securities 
regulators.69 The MMOU explicitly does not “create legally 
binding obligations or supersede domestic laws.”70 The 
provisions of the MMOU are very similar to those in the SEC’s 
bilateral MOUs, some of which are over two decades old.71 
 
years when Congress passed an act legitimizing the practice. See International Securities 
Enforcement Cooperation Act (“ISECA”), title II, sec. 202, § 24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16 
amending 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1990); codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) 
(legitimizing the signing of MOUs by the SEC). 
65. See IOSCO Members Lists, http://iosco.org/lists/index.cfm?section=general 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (listing ordinary, associate and affiliate members). 
66. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 707 (“The development of IOSCO, . . . with its 
intra-regulator discussions and principles, has created a forum in which securities 
regulators around the world are able to work together on technical issues and agree on 
principles for regulation.”); About IOSCO, supra note 63 (stating that a goal of IOSCO 
is “to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order to maintain 
just, efficient and sound markets”). 
67. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 703 (describing “IOSCO’s work on the 
harmonisation of disclosure and principles for regulators”); see also IOSCO, OBJECTIVES 
AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION ii (2003), available at http://iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (“Regulation should require disclosure, as set 
forth under the principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a 
collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of the investor’s 
interest in the scheme.”). 
68. See IOSCO Membership, supra note 64 (“Applicants for ordinary membership 
and applicants for associate membership, with primary responsibility for securities 
regulation in their jurisdictions, need to apply to become signatories to the IOSCO 
MOU and will need to sign the IOSCO MOU as a condition for being accepted as 
IOSCO members.”). 
69. Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and 
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information ¶ 6(a), May 2002, available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf [hereinafter MMOU]. 
70. Id. 
71. Compare MMOU, supra note 69, with discussion infra Part II.B.1–3 (containing 
similar provisions). 
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Like MOUs, the MMOU is also considered soft law. 
Standards set by IOSCO regarding the MMOU are considered 
neither international nor national law.72 Though noncommittal 
in nature, the agreement lays out the procedure for one party-
regulator (a regulator that has signed an MOU) to make 
information requests from another, as well as the actions each 
should undertake to meet the requests.73 
IOSCO also supports efforts by pairs of regulators to 
conclude their own bilateral Memoranda of Understanding. 
Typically these are supplementary to the MMOU and more 
tailored to the two regulators’ specific legal needs and powers.74 
Supplemental bilateral MOUs help solve one of the potential 
problems with the MMOU, namely that party-regulators with 
different levels of power limit its functional reach.75 For example, 
party-regulators that have the domestic power to compel 
testimony or disclosure can use a complementary MOU to 
account for the enforcement circumstances that exist in their 
respective states better than through the MMOU.76 
 
72. See MMOU, supra note 69, ¶ 6(a) (“The provisions of this Memorandum of 
Understanding are not intended to create legally binding obligations or supersede 
domestic laws.”); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in 
Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 885 (2009) (“IOSCO standards do not 
have the force of either international or national law.”). 
73. See MMOU, supra note 69, ¶ 6(a) (“This Memorandum of Understanding sets 
forth the Authorities’ intent with regard to mutual assistance and the exchange of 
information for the purpose of enforcing and securing compliance with the respective 
Laws and Regulations of the jurisdictions of the Authorities.”). 
74. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 144 (2009) (“IOSCO encouraged the development of a network of 
bilateral MOUs between national regulators, which could better take into account 
specific national laws and policies.”); IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR MEMORANDA OF 
UNDERSTANDING (1991), available at http://iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
ioscopd17.pdf (outlining the problems regulators face in creating MOUs). 
75. See SEC, The SEC’s Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_coopfactsheet.htm (last modified May 23, 2008) 
[hereinafter Coop Factsheet] (explaining the SEC’s current policy as only signing 
bilateral MOUs supplemental to the IOSCO MMOU when the other regulator has 
powers beyond those enumerated in the MMOU). 
76. See id.; see also Verdier, supra note 74, at 144. The MMOU has had to structure 
itself to be more inclusive. See MMOU, supra note 69, ¶¶ 7(b)(iii), 9(d) (containing 
provisions that are written to be inclusive). 
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2. United States Competitiveness 
The United States is now operating in an environment 
where its financial centers must compete with global rivals in 
order to attract businesses and investors. When the United States 
was the only realistic option for raising capital, the expenses of 
operating within the United States were perceived simply as costs 
of doing business. But with the rise of competitor financial 
centers, firms now have the opportunity to reduce these costs by 
shopping abroad for their capital-raising needs.77 Differences in 
securities laws between two states can result in significantly 
different costs for a non-domestic firm picking between those 
states’ financial markets.78 Reducing the impact of these 
differences, or the differences themselves, can give a state a 
competitive edge.79 
The United States has some compensatory advantages. 
Despite difficulties with competitiveness in U.S. markets, the 
NYSE remains the largest capital market in the world.80 Research 
interviews conducted by Professor Howell Jackson determined 
that demand for the U.S. dollar as a standard unit of exchange 
drives some of the capital activities of firms within the United 
States, thus confirming that the U.S. dollar remains a prominent 
 
77. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 504 (“When a competitor challenges U.S. 
dominance, however, U.S. firms and investors can no longer be indifferent to the impact 
of regulation on international financial activity.”); see also Steven Davidoff, Regulating 
Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 89 (2007) (“Non-U.S. companies 
increasingly appear to spurn U.S. stock markets and choose to list their securities 
abroad.”). 
78. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 487 (“Foreign firms with a U.S. presence still face 
increased regulatory costs due to the divergence between the U.S. regime and their local 
one.”); Tahyar, supra note 47, at 706 (discussing the harmonization and recognition of 
different nations’ securities laws). 
79. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 487; Tahyar, supra note 47, at 706 (“[T]here may 
still be significant barriers to access to markets even if national rules are similar or even 
identical.”). 
80. See Davidoff, supra note 77, at 98 (“The NYSE . . . is the largest in the world.”); 
see also Gadinis, supra note 58, at 493 (stating that the NYSE is “the largest stock 
exchange in the world”). 
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currency.81 Jackson’s interviews also concluded that the United 
States continues to be considered a prestige market.82 
However, U.S. markets also have hurdles to overcome. As 
already suggested, regulatory standards in the United States are 
higher than those required by regulators in other jurisdictions.83 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has highlighted the high 
risk of litigation that firms seeking capital inside the United 
States face, and the tort system’s high levels of inefficiency 
relative to competitor jurisdictions.84 Paulson has also pointed 
out the byzantine U.S. regulatory structure’s focus on to-the-
letter compliance with formulated rules, which robs the system of 
the flexibility to deal with different firms on an individualized 
basis.85 For instance, the regulations applied to each firm under 
the SEC’s jurisdiction are uniform, changing only if the firm is 
foreign and not a U.S. firm.86 Finally, Paulson has noted the role 
new rules, especially those created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
have had in increasing compliance costs for participating firms.87 
 
81. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International 
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe—Part II, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 207, 225 (2008) (“A 
separate reason for accessing U.S. capital markets was the desire to obtain . . . a medium 
of payment for making future acquisitions of firms located in the United States or at 
least with corporations with substantial numbers of U.S. shareholders.”). 
82. See id. at 224 (“The top two reasons for accessing U.S. capital markets were 
financial advantages (improved pricing as a result of additional demand from U.S. 
investors) and the prestige associated with entering the U.S. market.”). 
83. See Sara M. Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly 
Transnational Exchange?, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685, 709 (2008) (“The United States 
regulators require a much higher standard of disclosure than do their European 
counterparts.”); see also Henry M. Paulson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Remarks by 
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson on the Competitiveness of United States Capital 
Markets at the Economic Club of New York, Nov. 20, 2006, available at 
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp174.htm (“Yet recently, in the wake of new, 
heightened regulatory and listing requirements for all public companies in the U.S., we 
have witnessed changes in IPO activity.”). 
84. See Paulson, supra note 83 (“A sophisticated legal structure . . . is necessary to 
protect investors, businesses, and consumers . . . , [b]ut our legal system has gone 
beyond protection.”). 
85. See id. (stating that the SEC regulatory scheme is prescriptive and should be 
more flexible). 
86. See Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal Considerations Affecting Global Offerings of 
Shares in Foreign Companies, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 30, 31 (1996) (“[T]he rules 
applicable to U.S. companies are also noted where they differ in substance.”); Davidoff, 
supra note 77, at 151 (“The U.S. listings market is subject to one-size-fits-all regulation 
which varies only if the issuer is a domestic or non-domestic one.”). 
87. See Paulson, supra note 83 (explaining the effect of new rules in the context of 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
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The impact of these factors shows in the numbers. In 2005, 
for the first time, only six percent of capital raised globally by 
firms operating outside their home jurisdiction was raised in the 
United States.88 In the same year, only one of the top twenty-five 
initial public offerings was offered within the Unites States.89 
3. London’s Financial Services Administration 
The FSA in the United Kingdom provides a useful example 
of a new approach to regulatory objectives and the kind of 
competition the United States is facing. In stark contrast to 
Secretary Paulson’s statements about the U.S. regulatory regime, 
the Director of Enforcement at the FSA has characterized the 
FSA as “innovative and highly effective.”90 The FSA’s 
philosophical regulatory approach acknowledges that failures are 
impossible to eliminate, and thus the agency focuses on “big-
ticket” dangers.91 The FSA avoids imposing new rules until after 
an attempt to solve the problem through the market.92 
 
88. Davidoff, supra note 77, at 112 (“For example, in 2005, 352 companies issued 
equity outside their home markets for the first time, raising a total of $92 billion. Only 
six percent of this equity, or $4.6 billion, was raised on the U.S. public markets.”); see 
also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“[I]n 2005, approximately one in every 20 
[IPO] dollars was raised in the United States.”). One criticism is that U.S. regulation is a 
one-size-fits-all approach. See Davidoff, supra note 77, at 151 (“The U.S. listings market is 
subject to one-size-fits-all regulation which varies only if the issuer is a domestic or non-
domestic one.”); Paulson, supra note 83. 
89. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 30 (“Twenty-four of twenty-five of the 
largest IPOs in 2005 and nine of the ten largest IPOs in 2006 to date took place outside 
the United States.”); see also Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for 
Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2008) (“Instead, foreign exchanges have 
developed liquid markets of their own, and now consistently attract over 90 percent of 
the world’s initial public offerings (IPOs) and half of all investor activity.”). 
90. Margaret Cole, Dir. of Enforcement, Fin. Serv. Auth. [FSA], The U.K. FSA: 
Nobody Does it Better?, Lecture at the A.A. Sommer Jr. Lecture on Corporate, 
Securities, & Financial Law, in 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 267 (2007) (“But I 
would still argue that our model in the United Kingdom is an innovative and highly 
effective one.”). See generally Iain MacNeil, The Future for Financial Regulation: The 
Financial Services and Markets Bill, 62 MOD. L. REV. 725 (1999) (reviewing the structure 
and purpose of the FSA). 
91. See Cole, supra note 90, at 269 (discussing the “non-zero-failure regime”); THE 
TREASURY COMM., FSA, RECENT TURBULENCE IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
NORTHERN ROCK’S LIQUIDITY CRISIS (2007), ¶ 6, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/other/tsc.pdf (“In competitive markets there will be failures; as we have said in the 
past, it would be impossible—and, in any event, undesirable to seek to eliminate all risk 
from financial markets and to operate a zero-failure regime.”). 
92. See Cole, supra note 90, at 269 (“Our philosophy is that only after market 
solutions have been exhausted should regulatory initiatives be contemplated.”); FSA, A 
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Outcomes, rather than process, are the priority for the FSA, 
giving it the flexibility the SEC is struggling to achieve.93 By 
structuring normative guidelines, the FSA is able to tailor its 
approach to specific situations, while the SEC proscribes rules 
that mandate compliance even if the particular needs of a 
transaction or situation may be less than those required.94 
4. SEC Rules 
Many SEC rules are relevant to U.S. and foreign firms 
seeking to utilize U.S. financial markets. SEC Rule 144A and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in particular, have created very important 
considerations for foreign firms seeking to raise capital within 
the United States. Each requirement has significantly altered how 
foreign companies view the capital-raising potential of the U.S. 
market and their deliberations about whether to enter it. 
Promulgated in order to reduce the barriers to foreign firms 
seeking to raise capital in the United States,95 Rule 144A permits 
foreign issuers to sidestep SEC registration requirements by 
limiting the sale of their offering to institutional, and thus 
presumably sophisticated, buyers.96 The securities offered, 
however, must not be the same as the issuer’s other publicly held 
securities.97 Rule 144A offerings are now non-U.S. firms’ 
 
GUIDE TO MARKET FAILURE ANALYSIS AND HIGH LEVEL COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/mfa_guide.pdf (discussing the 
importance of market failure in the FSA’s regulatory outlook). 
93. See Cole, supra note 90, at 270 (“[T]he FSA is an advocate for principles-based 
regulation . . . [with a] focus . . . on the outcomes rather than on the prescription of 
detailed rules.”); Paulson, supra note 83; see also Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Sarbanes-Oxley Five 
Years Later: A Canadian Perspective, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 469 (2008) (“[T]he UK 
approach places emphasis on normative guidelines rather than detailed rules.”). 
94. See Cole, supra note 90, at 270; Paulson, supra note 83; see also Ben-Ishai, supra 
note 93, at 469. 
95. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009) 
(listing the requirements for a 144A listing); Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 246 
(“[W]hen the SEC adopted Rule 144A in April 1990, the Commission intended to make 
it easier for foreign issuers to enter the U.S. markets.”). 
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (requiring that the securities be “offered or sold only 
to a qualified institutional buyer or to an offeree or purchaser that the seller and any 
person acting on behalf of the seller reasonably believe is a qualified institutional 
buyer.”); Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 212 n.4 (“Rule 144A offers publicly-traded 
foreign issuers greater leeway in raising equity from large institutional investors located 
in the United States than is available to publicly traded U.S. domestic issuers.”). 
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (listing the qualifications for exemption). 
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preferred method of raising capital in the United States.98 The 
potential effect of excluding retail investors from these offerings 
is in large part reduced because demand for foreign securities 
comes mainly from institutional investors—no doubt partially a 
result of the high costs individual retail investors face in such 
transactions.99 
Despite its liberal treatment of non-U.S. issuers, Rule 144A 
does not exempt issuers utilizing the rule from all other SEC 
requirements.100 Firms taking advantage of Rule 144A remain 
within the umbrella of the SEC’s enforcement provisions for 
proscribed conduct regarding investors.101 In particular, firms 
remain subject to the SEC’s antifraud provisions.102 One such 
important rule, Rule 10b-5, is a wide-reaching antifraud 
regulation that prohibits using any “means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, . . . mails or . . . any facility of any national 
securities exchange[]” to commit fraud or release false material 
facts.103 
Conscientious firms can entirely avoid interference from the 
SEC. Regulation S specifies that a foreign firm is not subject to 
the U.S. Securities Act of 1933104 when the firm’s offering is made 
outside the United States and is not directed at U.S. citizens, 
provided that such securities are not resold to U.S. citizens for a 
 
98. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 46 (stating that in 2005, over ninety 
percent of all foreign initial public offering capital raised in the U.S. was through Rule 
144A exemptions); see also Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 244 (showing in Table 3 the 
growing importance of Rule 144A offerings). 
99. See Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 232 (“[T]he demand for foreign shares in 
the United States was predominantly from institutional investors, whether sold in public 
offerings or in Rule 144A transactions.”); see also Tahyar, supra note 47, at 699 (stating 
that “most national systems make it burdensome and costly for retail investors to invest 
in foreign securities”). 
100. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (“This section relates solely to the application of 
section 5 of the Act and not to antifraud or other provisions of the federal securities 
laws.”). 
101. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2009) (making it unlawful for any person to use an instrument of interstate commerce 
for fraud in a securities transaction); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A. 
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A. 
103. Id. § 240.10b-5. 
104. See Gary M. Brown, Securities Act Registration Exemptions, 1756 PLI/CORP. 209, 
240 (2009) (discussing Regulation S as a safe harbor provision); Harvey, supra note 59, 
at 159 (discussing Regulation S as a safe harbor provision). 
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year.105 Transactions meeting these requirements are functionally 
exempt from the SEC’s registration requirements.106 Firms falling 
under this regulation avoid both the risk of litigation in the 
United States and the substantial costs of registering securities 
with the SEC. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act107 was passed in 2002 in response to 
the corporate scandals surrounding Enron, Worldcom, and 
Arthur Andersen.108 The Act contains broad provisions requiring 
non-U.S. firms to comply with its measures.109 For example, 
section 106 requires that non-U.S. accounting firms, if they 
undertake the corporate governance work specified in the Act, 
must comply with the same standards as U.S. accounting firms.110 
 
105. See Brown, supra note 104, at 240 (“The regulation is complex, but one of its 
main features is that in the kind of transaction described, the securities may not be 
reoffered or resold to U.S. persons for one year.”); Harvey, supra note 59, at 159 
(“Regulation S provides safe harbors for issuers in response to the question of whether it 
is appropriate to require an issuer to register its securities under the Securities Act of 
1933—even though there would be jurisdiction to do so—when it offers those securities 
exclusively to non-U.S. citizens in offshore transactions.”). 
106. See Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United States Without 
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-05 (2007) (detailing 
the Regulation S exemption); see also Brown, supra note 104, at 240 (“[Regulation S] is 
an interpretive regulation by which one can determine if a particular offshore 
transaction is subject to the Securities Act.”); Harvey, supra note 59, at 159 (“Regulation 
S provides safe harbors for issuers when it offers those securities exclusively to non-U.S. 
citizens in offshore transactions.”). In the case of non-U.S. firms offering securities to 
non-U.S. citizens outside of the United States, it is difficult to see how the United States 
could obtain jurisdiction anyway. See infra notes 152–184 and accompanying text 
(discussing U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
108. See Saylor, supra note 83, at 707 (“In the wake of corporate scandals of the 
1990s, the U.S. Congress amended the laws governing corporate governance and 
disclosure . . . by regulated companies to increase investor confidence.”); see also 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1591 (2005) (pointing out that Sarbanes-Oxley is a prime example of 
poor legislative product that comes out of rushed Congressional action responding to 
emergency situations). 
109. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 471 (“SOX [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] has an 
extraterritorial application in that it applies to all publicly traded companies on U.S. 
stock exchanges, notwithstanding their status as cross-listed foreign issuers.”); Saylor, 
supra note 83, at 708 (“Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted hastily in response to financial scandals, 
includes sections which apply to foreign issuers without consideration as to whether it 
was appropriate to do so.”). 
110. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 107-204, at § 106(a)(1), 
116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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Of all the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, section 404 
is among the most notorious.111 The section requires the 
corporate management of a securities-issuing firm to attest to the 
effectiveness of its internal requirements for financial 
reporting.112 Section 404 further requires that an independent 
auditor, in the form of a registered public accounting firm, 
report on the statements made by the corporate management.113  
The benefits of section 404 include the reduction of 
information costs for investors and increased efficiency within 
companies’ internal reporting systems.114 But although it has had 
benefits, in the final calculation, section 404 has been 
detrimental to U.S. competitiveness. It has drastically increased 
compliance costs for foreign firms.115 Average per-firm costs of 
compliance ended up thirty-five times higher than initial 
estimates.116 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 
 
111. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 115 (“The main policy debate over 
SOX, however, is focused on the implementation of a single provision, Section 
404 . . . .”); see also Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 483–84 (“The current focus on amending 
or rolling back SOX is centered upon section 404, which deals with internal controls.”). 
112. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 107-204, at § 404(a), 116 
Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (listing internal assessment 
controls in SOX). 
113. See id. § 404(b) (“With respect to the internal control assessment required by 
subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit 
report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the 
management of the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection shall be made in 
accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted by the Board. 
Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate engagement.”). 
114. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 119 (“Section 404 control reviews 
appear to have acted as a catalyst for companies to improve the efficiency of financial 
management”); see also Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 478 (explaining the benefits of SOX 
as being “more efficient financial reporting processes and improved management 
understanding of corporate risks”). 
115. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 115 (“There is widespread concern that 
the compliance costs of Section 404 [of SOX] are excessive.”); see also Davidoff, supra 
note 77, at 132 (“[T]he increased level of regulation imposed on non-U.S. issuers by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been qualitatively significant.”); Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 471 
(stating that Sarbanes-Oxley is seen “as imposing higher costs than benefits”). Other 
jurisdictions considered implementing reforms similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, but ultimately 
rejected the idea. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 480 (“Multilateral Instrument 52-111, 
the Canadian equivalent of section 404 of SOX, was not implemented . . . .”); Saylor, 
supra note 83, at 709 (“Nevertheless, Sarbanes-Oxley and similar European regulations 
are not quite the same. The United States regulators require a much higher standard of 
disclosure than do their European counterparts.”). 
116. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 126 (showing that the SEC’s initial 
estimate was thirty-five times lower than the actual cost of compliance); Cost Estimates of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance on the Rise, http://my.advisor.com/doc/14592 (last visited 
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designed to explore methods of improving U.S. financial 
markets’ competitiveness, has concluded that a more efficient 
implementation of section 404 is necessary—in particular one 
which does not subject foreign firms to duplicate regulation 
when they already face requirements similar to section 404 in 
their home states.117 
Despite the problems within its financial markets, the 
United States remains a significant and important actor in 
international finance. If the United States can make itself more 
attractive compared to its competitor jurisdictions, the trend 
towards investing through U.S. competitors may be slowed, or 
even reversed. This can be achieved by reducing the barriers 
firms and investors face when operating within the United States, 
including lessening the impact of regulatory differences and 
expanding effective enforcement transnationally. 
C. Feasibility of International Cooperation 
The field of securities regulation presents serious issues 
regarding international cooperation. Specific shared norms are 
infrequent in securities regulation, but securities enforcement 
seems to be an area ripe for coordination.118 The structure of the 
markets in question—here international financial markets—
changes the likelihood and effectiveness of attempts to 
coordinate between states. IOSCO is not the only organization 
active in this field; in 2004 the Organization for Economic 
Development put together standards for corporate governance, 
including disclosure.119 
 
Aug. 21, 2010) (“The cost estimates of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 compliance rose 62 
percent in six months . . . .”). 
117. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 131, 133 (“The Committee would not 
apply Section 404 to foreign firms that could demonstrate that they were subject to 
equivalent home country internal control regulation.”). 
118. See Hannah L Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
251, 264 (2006) (“[T]here are fewer shared norms in the area of securities 
regulation.”); Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 462 (2006) (“[T]he rapid integration of 
financial markets suggests the utility of harmonizing securities regulation and 
corporation law.”). 
119. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 264 (discussing international accounting 
principles); see also OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9 (2004), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (2004) (discussing the 
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1. Market Structures 
The way a particular market is structured changes the 
arrangement of the incentives of its participants and affects the 
prospects for meaningful cooperation within it. Stravos Gadinis, a 
post-graduate fellow at Harvard Law School specializing in 
international finance and securities regulation, has outlined four 
types of international market structures and what they imply for 
the likelihood of cooperation: (1) a centralized market under 
strong dominance; (2) a dispersed market under strong 
dominance; (3) a centralized market with contested dominance; 
and (4) a dispersed market with contested dominance.120 As 
transnational finance moves away from a U.S.-dominated and 
centered model into a more pluralistic structure, where the 
global market ultimately ends up is relevant to the prospects and 
structure of any potential cooperative scheme. The first and third 
market models are relevant to the changes currently taking place 
in international finance. 
A centralized market under strong dominance, the first 
model, is akin to a system where only one exchange of 
meaningful size exists globally.121 Such a dominant center is not 
motivated to respond to the desires of foreign entities.122 In a 
strongly dominated and centralized market, foreign governments 
expect to structure their own rules to make it easier for their 
firms to operate with the dominant center.123 Thus, the standards 
of non-dominant states tend to converge on the standards of the 
dominant center.124 The past U.S. dominance in the global 
financial market post-World War II is a model example of such a 
centralized market with strong dominance.125 
 
promulgation of the OECD corporate governance standards); Robbins, supra note 118, 
at 463 (discussing the OECD principles of corporate governance). 
120. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 451–52 (explaining the meaning of different 
dimensions of market structures). 
121. See id. at 470–73 (discussing centralized markets under strong dominance 
generally). 
122. See id. at 473 (discussing the unlikelihood of success of foreign firms lobbying 
the dominant center). 
123. See id. at 474 (“Local governments that wish to minimize compliance costs for 
their constituents are more likely to accept ‘coordination’ with a set of rules very close, if 
not identical, to the dominant center’s regime.”). 
124. See id.  
125. See id. at 475 (“Up to the early 2000s, U.S. dominance in the primary securities 
markets was strong. Foreign companies gravitated toward U.S. markets to take advantage 
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A more recent example from a related field illustrates how 
the theory of converging standards plays out in practice. 
European states attempted to force the United States to allow 
more Europe-friendly accounting standards to be applied to 
foreign companies seeking to raise capital in the United States.126 
However, the United States refused to acquiesce and the 
international accounting standards ended up close to existing 
U.S. standards, thus demonstrating that the U.S. retains some 
muscle in international finance.127 
In a centralized market with contested dominance, the third 
model, competitors rise to challenge an old hegemon, forcing 
investors and firms to choose between established financial 
centers.128 In situations like these, there is a danger of a race to 
the bottom—that competing financial centers could attempt to 
attract more investors and capital through progressively 
permissive regulation.129 Alternatively, the competing centers 
could respond with a race to the top to capture more of the 
global financial market through more innovative regulation—
regulation that is more effective while lowering costs.130 
Ultimately, cooperation is unlikely as governments seek to 
protect their own center from competition and retain their 
domestic market by making regulations incompatible with their 
competitors’ regulations.131 Governments are more likely to bow 
to pressure from powerful domestic groups controlling the 
domestic centers than to the needs of foreign entities.132 As more 
 
of their deeper liquidity and lower cost of capital, often combining a public offering 
with a listing on a U.S. stock exchange.”). 
126. See id. at 479 (“The European Commission hoped that under the political 
weight of twenty-five jurisdictions, the IASB would be able to push for accounting 
solutions preferable to European companies otherwise disadvantaged by U.S. GAAP.”). 
127. See id. (“In the end, the United States did not yield in its insistence that the 
differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS be reduced to a minimum (i.e., that IFRS 
obtain virtually the same content as U.S. GAAP) before the reconciliation requirement 
could be dropped.”). 
128. See id. at 490 (“In centralized markets, competition between the dominant 
center and a new venue leads to increased polarization.”). 
129. See id. at 492 (“The dominant center may engage in a race to the top or to the 
bottom against its competitor to attract more investors from third countries.”). 
130. See id.  
131. See id. (“Eventually, the dominant center’s government will maintain 
regulatory barriers that increase the costs investors from the dominant center face when 
seeking to access the competitor’s market.”). 
132. See id. (“Thus, the groups opposing coordination and seeking protection from 
the dominant center’s government are likely to have greater domestic influence; these 
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financial centers arise and develop to compete with the United 
States, global capital markets correspond more and more closely 
to this model.133 
These different types of markets warrant different 
approaches to international cooperation. It appears that the 
international financial system is drifting from a centralized 
market with uncontested dominance to one with contested 
dominance—financial centers are clearly defined and competing 
with each other to capture new investment. As the uncontested 
dominance of the United States fades, governments and 
regulators operating within this environment have to overcome 
increasing incentives to not cooperate. In the particular case of 
financial centers within a state, pressure for more stringent and 
internationally incompatible regulation may come from retail 
investor voters—particularly salient in the United States—rather 
than the finance industry itself, since their income is dependent 
on attracting investors and firms seeking to raise capital. 
Regulators seeking to cooperate across national borders need to 
balance these two forces. 
2. Other Considerations 
Cooperation can be affected by a wide range of other 
factors. The perception of the motivations behind attempts to 
coordinate can make actors balk at participation. Differing 
norms between jurisdictions and domestic pressures may also 
either inhibit or promote cooperation. 
International sensitivity about the real motivations behind 
coordination can hinder its prospects. The proliferation of a 
regulatory standard may be an expression of a state’s hegemony, 
or at least be perceived as such, and make other states uneasy 
about participating.134 This apprehension is born out of concern 
 
entities are typically cohesive and well-resourced interest groups perceived as central to 
the local economy.”). 
133. See id. at 494 (“Although capitalization data confirm the preeminence of U.S. 
markets in terms of size, developments in foreign stock exchanges during the 1990s have 
allowed them to contest the dominance of U.S. market operators.”); see also supra notes 
77–89 and accompanying text (discussing American competitiveness). 
134. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 303–04 (“[C]oncerns of observers . . . do 
speak to continued reservations regarding the appropriateness of applying international 
regulatory norms in domestic courts—particularly . . . if both the source of the norms 
and their enforcement are centralized in one country.”); Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 
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that one state’s norms will be imposed on other states through 
the creation of international law in a dominated forum.135 For 
example, one of IOSCO’s successes has been the development of 
a standard for disclosure in international offerings.136 However, 
this standard is very similar to the SEC’s pre-existing 
requirements.137 Such similarities are taken to demonstrate U.S. 
influence in the global capital market, rather than a genuine 
international consensus on disclosure.138 
Irreconcilably different norms can also sink attempts at 
cooperation.139 For example, IOSCO’s successes have come in 
areas, such as fraud prevention, where the domestic preferences 
of the involved states are closely aligned.140 In other areas, such as 
 
(“The form was in fact virtually identical to the SEC’s existing form for private foreign 
issuers, and its adoption reflected little more than an exercise of U.S. market power in 
setting global disclosure standards.”). 
135. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 303–04 (discussing the appropriateness of 
applying one state’s norms to another state through the creation of international law); 
Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (“[The disclosure form’s] adoption reflected little more 
than an exercise of U.S. market power in setting global disclosure standards.”). 
136. See Robbins, supra note 118, at 462 (stating that “[o]ne of the IOSCO’s key 
projects has been the formation of a core set of disclosure standards for nonfinancial 
statement portions of a proposed international offering document,” which the SEC 
adopted); Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (“In 1998, IOSCO adopted a standardized form 
intended to be used by its members as a uniform standard for nonfinancial disclosure by 
foreign firms raising capital in their jurisdiction.”). See generally ISOSCO, 
INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND INITIAL 
LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_corpfin/crossborder.pdf (containing IOSCO’s disclosure standards). 
137. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (“The [IOSCO disclosure] form was in fact 
virtually identical to the SEC’s existing form for private foreign issuers . . . .”); see also J. 
William Hicks, Harmonization of Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Share Offerings: 
Approaching an “International Passport” to Capital Markets?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
361, 372 n.27 (2002) (stating that “the SEC was a major participant” in IOSCO efforts to 
put out the disclosure standards, thus influencing outcome). 
138. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (stating that “[the disclosure form’s] 
adoption reflected little more than an exercise of U.S. market power in setting global 
disclosure standards”); see also Hicks, supra note 136, at 372 n.27 (stating that “the SEC 
was a major participant” in IOSCO efforts to put out the disclosure standards, thus 
influencing the outcome). 
139. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 295 (explaining the discrepancy between 
domestic norms and the effect on cooperative prospects, including over whether 
“private lawsuits may be inappropriate means to pursue public regulatory goals”); 
Verdier, supra note 74, at 126 (“If the participants in TRNs were free to disregard 
domestic preferences in their states and pursue globally optimal policies, distributive 
and enforcement problems would not hinder international regulatory cooperation.”). 
140. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 143 (“IOSCO has been largely successful at 
coordinating securities enforcement among developed countries because they share 
strong domestic preferences in preventing transnational securities fraud.”); Thomas D. 
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dealing with offshore financial havens, IOSCO has met serious 
difficulties in convincing such states to give up lucrative 
practices.141 In general, large developed states have been more 
ready participants in cooperative schemes, to a significant extent 
because capital markets comprise such large and advanced parts 
of their economies.142 
The domestic forces acting on securities regulators are also 
important in shaping their outlook and actions. Even as markets 
become ever more international, drawing investors from around 
the world, securities regulators remain domestic entities limited 
by statutory mandates.143 This link to the legislative process and 
the constituent pressures acting on legislators can undermine 
attempts by regulators to exercise independence through 
unilateral regulatory reform.144 Concerns about the ability of 
partner regulators to resist political pressure to deviate from 
informally agreed upon standards make even strongly 
independent regulators hesitant to enter into such agreements 
with weaker counterparts.145 
 
Willett, National Macroeconomic Policy Preferences and International Coordination Issues, 8 J. 
PUB. POLICY 235, 235 (1988) (“It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that domestic 
political pressures frequently have a major impact on national macroeconomic policy 
making.”). 
141. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 143 (“IOSCO faced considerable resistance in its 
efforts to secure enforcement cooperation from offshore financial centers (“OFC”s), 
which have strong domestic incentives to protect their financial industry through strict 
privacy laws and lax securities fraud enforcement.”); Willett, supra note 140, at 235. 
142. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 146 (stating that “[IOSCO’s] success can be 
accounted for by these states’ parallel domestic preferences for effective securities 
enforcement[,]” especially when both markets are highly developed); Willett, supra note 
140, at 235. 
143. See Davidoff, supra note 77, at 124 (“[T]he interests of securities regulators 
still tend to be local.”); see also Verdier, supra note 74, at 126 (“[Regulators] are instead 
politically and legally accountable to numerous domestic constituencies, including not 
only their superiors in the executive branch but also the legislature, the courts, the 
media, and the public.”). 
144. See David A. Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory 
Harmonization, 58 INT’L ORG. 531, 532–35, 537–44 (2004) (discussing the “win-set” for 
regulators as a range of action that will satisfy a range of both competitiveness and 
confidence in the market acceptable to legislators without them intervening); see also 
Verdier, supra note 74, at 127 (“[P]oliticians exercise significant influence over the 
administrative process.”). 
145. See Singer, supra note 144, at 532–35, 537–44 (talking about a restricted “win-
set” for regulators as a range of agreement that will be acceptable enough to legislators 
to prevent them from intervening, which could negate commitments made unilaterally 
by the regulator); Verdier, supra note 74, at 127 (“Even a powerful and independent 
regulator like the Federal Reserve might hesitate to commit itself to a demanding 
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Attempting to reconcile different norms among 
international actors raises the costs of international coordination. 
Domestic constraints on actors and suspicion of the motivations 
behind international efforts may scuttle attempts to cooperate. 
MOUs sidestep many of these problems by being very narrow—
really only a framework for cooperation—and by being 
nonenforceable, thus encouraging otherwise hesitant regulators 
to sign by minimizing the potential effect of their provisions. 
Even when parties have entered into an MOU in part because it 
is unenforceable, the existence of the agreement facilitates more 
cooperation than would otherwise occur, creating a surprisingly 
effective arrangement between diverse regulators. 
3. A European Union Development 
The EU has undertaken an ambitious project to substantially 
harmonize aspects of the securities laws of its Member States. The 
Financial Services Action Plan presented uniform rules to 
accelerate the integration of financial markets across the EU.146 
In particular, FSAP’s established standard disclosure 
requirements allow securities that pass muster in one EU 
jurisdiction to travel freely within the EU.147 
However, the plan is not completely comprehensive. FSAP 
allows individual states to determine which rules to apply when 
the securities in question are not publicly offered, or are below a 
 
international standard if it suspected that some of its foreign counterparts would be 
unable to resist domestic political pressures to breach that standard.”). 
146. See FSAP, supra note 34 (discussing the European move to a single market and 
FSAP’s goals within that framework); Council Directive No. 2003/71, art. 1, 2003 O.J. L 
345/64, at 68 [hereinafter Prospectus Directive] (“The purpose of this Directive is to 
harmonise requirements for the drawing up, approval and distribution of the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a 
regulated market situated or operating within a Member State.”); see also Enriques & 
Gatti, supra note 34, at 43 (“The main purpose of the FSAP was to provide the legal 
bedrock for EU financial markets’ integration through uniform rules that, while 
providing a high level of investor protection, at the same time lower the costs that 
otherwise stem from the joint application of differing Member States’ legal regimes to 
cross-border transactions.”). 
147. See FSAP, supra note 34, at 12 (discussing the European move to a single 
market and FSAP’s goals within that framework); Enriques & Gatti, supra note 34, at 54 
(“The Directive gives issuers a ‘passport’ to allow them to raise capital within the 
European borders on the basis of a single prospectus in order to reduce EU issuers’ 
overall transaction costs.”). 
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certain aggregate value threshold.148 Finally, national regulators 
are left with the ultimate regulatory power over securities 
emanating from their jurisdictions, regardless of where they 
travel under FSAP’s umbrella.149 This arrangement, as a concept, 
is beyond the role of an MOU, but serves as a useful example of 
successful—and binding—coordination in transnational 
securities markets.150 
Developments in international finance have been rapid and 
will likely continue in direction, if not in strength. The SEC and 
other regulators have acknowledged the importance of this 
growing field and regulatory innovation within it.151 These 
important changes require a new, more cooperative approach to 
international securities regulation. Although the U.S. global 
market share has declined, the United States retains the political 
and economic muscle to take the lead in the global discussion 
about international securities regulation cooperation. Regulatory 
changes within the United States and other pressures, including 
IOSCO’s cooperative efforts, may yet negate some aspects 
contributing to the trends reducing U.S. influence and 
attractiveness. Understanding market structures, as well as other 
pressures and considerations acting on regulators and 
governments, contributes to structuring international 
cooperation in a way most likely to be successful. MOUs respond 
to these issues and are structured to succeed within their 
environment. 
 
148. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 146, No. 2003/71, art. 1, 2003 O.J. L 
345/64, at 68 (“Notwithstanding paragraph 2(b), (d), (h), (i) and (j), an issuer, an 
offeror or a person asking for admission to trading on a regulated market shall be 
entitled to draw up a prospectus in accordance with this Directive when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading.”); see also Enriques & Gatti, supra note 34, 
at 56 (“[L]ocal legislatures appear to be able to apply the harmonized regime or even 
their own idiosyncratic national provisions also to transactions that, as a matter of EC 
law, do not constitute a public offer.”). 
149. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 146, No. 2003/71, art. 13, 2003 O.J. L 
345/64, at 76 (stating that prospectuses must be approved by home state regulator 
before they can disseminate to the market); see also Enriques & Gatti, supra note 34, at 58 
(stating that the home regulator has jurisdiction regardless of where the securities it 
approved are traded within the EU). 
150. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text (discussing the scope and 
measures of FSAP, including disclosure standards). 
151. See supra note 45 (discussing SEC changes). 
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II. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE MOU 
FRAMEWORK 
The SEC has been able to take advantage of U.S. courts’ 
eagerness to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction in prosecuting 
financial misconduct abroad. However, foreign secrecy laws 
continue to be a difficult hurdle for parties and courts seeking or 
compelling disclosure from non-U.S. jurisdictions. The MOU 
helps overcome these challenges and targets others, including 
the development of effective capital markets and regulation 
within other states. Access to information by the SEC seems to 
have greatly increased as a result of its MOU agreements with 
foreign regulators. As a soft-law mechanism, the MOU is not 
binding, but is instead structured in such a way as to acknowledge 
and accommodate potential conflicts between regulators. In this 
capacity, it is a framework for information-exchange cooperation 
and creates expected methods of interaction and communication 
between regulators. 
In order to further the understanding of MOUs as a 
cooperative framework, Part II.A examines the state of U.S. 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and disclosure jurisprudence. Part 
II.B studies the actual form of the MOU, in its enforcement 
cooperation, regulatory cooperation, and technical assistance 
forms. That information is then applied to a simple economic-
political game in Part II.C to extract its potential usefulness as a 
procedural structure. Part II.D briefly discusses some other states 
that have signed MOUs. Lastly, Part II.E looks at U.S. statutes 
related to MOUs and their confidentiality provisions. 
A. Reaching Out: Extraterritorial Judicial Considerations 
The SEC has expressed its own mission as: (1) protecting 
investors; (2) maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; 
and (3) facilitating capital formation.152 In carrying out this 
mandate, however, the SEC has increasingly faced conduct that 
occurs overseas.153 Extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
 
152. See SEC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 60, at 4 (detailing the mission of the 
SEC). 
153. See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text (discussing American 
competitiveness and changes in global investment markets that expose U.S. entities to 
more transnational investment). 
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extraterritorial disclosure are two tools U.S. courts have utilized 
to deal with foreign defendants. 
U.S. jurisdiction theory is fundamentally based on 
territoriality—the idea that a state has authority only over that 
which occurs within its own borders.154 Comity, a connected 
concept, holds that a state should not interfere with the actions 
of another state.155 These notions, however, have proven 
somewhat incompatible when dealing with the new kinds of 
transnational issues facing the SEC and other enforcement 
bodies.156 
1. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in a Securities Context 
When the SEC brings securities violation actions against 
foreign defendants, it must meet U.S. courts’ jurisdictional 
standards—the defendant’s conduct must have been subject to 
U.S. law. Courts in the United States only apply U.S. laws outside 
of U.S. borders when Congress has intended to provide for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.157 Congressional legislative history is 
 
154. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 280–82 (“[B]ecause [jurisdiction] remains 
rooted in notions of territorial sovereignty, it is simply not well suited to cases that 
involve forms of global harm in which both the conduct and its effects are felt 
simultaneously in many jurisdictions—harm that, in a sense, does not merely cross 
borders but transcends them.”); see also Caryn R. Nutt, Carnero v. Boston Scientific 
Corporation: Interpreting the Extraterritorial Effect of the Civil Whistleblower Protection Provision 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 201, 208 (2006) (discussing the territoriality 
presumption). 
155. See Nutt, supra note 154, at 208–09 (explaining the connection between 
territoriality and “‘the principle of international comity, under which the United States 
should avoid interference with the laws of another sovereign over conduct occurring 
within its territory.’”) (quoting Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879, 
882 (E.D. Pa. 1995)); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the 
Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflicts, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 648–49 (2009) (discussing the 
connection between territoriality and comity). 
156. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 281–82 (“In the securities context too, the 
jurisdictional analysis based on territorial links respects the sovereignty of other 
countries, but fails to account for the fairly global arguments made in favor of United 
States jurisdiction.”); Nutt, supra note 154, at 207–08, 214–15 (discussing territoriality 
presumption and the difficulty in expanding jurisdiction to include “extraterritorial” 
jurisdictions). 
157. See Nutt, supra note 154, at 209 (“[T]he territoriality presumption typically 
operates to limit the reach of legislation to application only within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States unless Congress has expressly conferred extraterritorial 
authority”); Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1314 (1985) (“The language and legislative history of 
the securities acts are rather unclear with respect to extraterritoriality. In light of this 
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useful in determining congressional intent, but such legislative 
history must be tempered with the knowledge that Congress is 
aware that it must make a statement of clear intent within a given 
statute. Therefore, the absence of clearly stated intent can itself 
be evidence of intent to limit jurisdiction.158 
In practice, however, U.S. courts have often found such 
intent and viewed their own jurisdiction broadly.159 Regarding 
securities, courts have inferred a congressional intent for 
extraterritorial application regardless of the lack of express 
statements by Congress, in large part because Congress did not 
anticipate the rise in importance of transnational securities 
transactions.160 
Courts have justified jurisdiction in securities cases under a 
variety of reasons. At a seeming extreme, the Eighth Circuit has 
gone so far as to claim jurisdiction where the matter was brought 
by a foreign plaintiff; involved securities issued by a foreign firm 
and not available within the United States; lacked any domestic 
effect; and was born out of conduct taken, in most part, outside 
 
ambiguous jurisdictional mandate, courts have stretched the statutory language, 
divining an unexpressed congressional intent.”). 
158. See Nutt, supra note 154, at 213, 219 (stating that “the legislative history of the 
congressional action is a key part of this inquiry” and that “Congress is aware of the 
need to make a clear statement that it intends legislative action to apply 
extraterritorially”); Note, supra note 157, at 1314 (“The language and legislative history 
of the securities acts are rather unclear with respect to extraterritoriality. In light of this 
ambiguous jurisdictional mandate, courts have stretched the statutory language, 
divining an unexpressed congressional intent.”). 
159. See Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering United States Regulation of Foreign 
Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523, 523 (1993) (“Traditionally the United States has 
viewed its jurisdiction expansively and imposed its regulations on transactions that may 
be viewed as essentially foreign.”); see also Plessey Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 628 F.Supp. 477, 
494 (D. Del. 1986) (“To prevent the United States from becoming a ‘Barbary Coast’ 
hospitable to international securities ‘pirates’ who defraud investors, the exercise of 
jurisdiction by American courts must be broad.” (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 
(3d Cir. 1977)). 
160. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 548 (“The courts have responded that Congress 
could not have been expected, when the Exchange Act was drafted, to foresee the 
development of an international and largely interdependent market for securities.”); see 
also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The Congress 
that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the midst of the depression could 
hardly have been expected to foresee the development of off-shore funds thirty years 
later.”). 
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the United States.161 In general, though, U.S. courts have typically 
accepted jurisdiction partially to deter foreign entities from 
engaging in misconduct by providing a forum for foreign 
plaintiffs to redress their injuries.162 This interest becomes more 
relevant as the effects of financial misconduct are increasingly 
border-blind and the opportunities for transnational misconduct 
become more common.163 
There are three basic conditions that may trigger 
jurisdiction by U.S. courts. An explanatory case, Bersch v. Drexel 
Firestone, Inc., involved a foreign offering where investors had 
been given false and misleading information about the prospects 
and activities of the issuing company.164 In Bersch, the Second 
Circuit articulated the three circumstances under which federal 
securities laws apply: (1) when “Americans resident in the United 
States” are injured; (2) when U.S. citizens abroad have been 
injured and material acts occurred within the United States; and 
(3) when acts that occurred within the United States directly 
caused the injury to foreigners not resident in the United 
States.165 
Beyond being subject to the laws of the United States, a 
defendant must also be subject to the authority of the court in 
which the suit is brought. Courts in the United States require 
both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.166 Courts apply the 
“minimum contacts” test to find personal jurisdiction.167 But, in 
order to obtain subject matter jurisdiction in securities suits with 
 
161. Cont’l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420–21 
(8th Cir. 1979) (discussing the court’s concern with fraud perpetrated in part from 
within United States). 
162. See id. at 420; Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 281 (“[P]laintiffs had presented a 
plausible argument that this type of harm would be insufficiently deterred if foreign 
purchasers could not litigate their claims in United States courts.”). 
163. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 282 (“[I]t makes little sense to suggest that 
the effects of fraud can be territorially segregated.”); Schapiro Speech, supra note 45 
(“[B]ecause our sovereign power cannot cross borders with as much ease, fraud often 
gets a head start on our enforcement efforts.”). 
164. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987 (“Here the final prospectus emanated from a 
foreign source, London or Brussels in the case of the Drexel offering, Toronto in the 
case of the Crang offering, and apparently the Bahamas and Geneva in the case of the 
IOB offering.”). 
165. See id. at 993 (listing when federal antifraud securities laws apply). 
166. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) 
(discussing jurisdictional requirements). 
167. See generally id. (discussing the concept and application of minimum contacts). 
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international parties, U.S. courts can apply either or both the 
conduct test or the effects test.168 
Meeting these tests confers jurisdiction and satisfies the 
requirement of territoriality, as the Eighth Circuit has 
explained.169 The effects test is satisfied when substantial effects 
of a foreign transaction are felt within the United States.170 
However, these effects must be fairly direct to trigger 
jurisdiction.171 The impact can be felt either by specific markets 
within the United States or by individual U.S. investors.172 
The conduct test is rooted in the important goal of 
preventing the United States from becoming an exporter of 
financial misconduct.173 It can be applied even if no harmful 
 
168. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 542–43 (mentioning the alternate conduct or 
effect standards for imposing jurisdiction); see also Colleen P. Mahoney, International 
Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws, 1743 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 861, 889 (2009) (discussing conduct and effect tests). 
169. See Cont’l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 
(8th Cir. 1979) (“[F]inding subject matter jurisdiction after such an analysis is consistent 
with the subjective territorial principle of international law.”). 
170. See Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261–62 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“The anti-fraud laws of the United States may be given extraterritorial reach 
whenever a predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects within the United 
States.”); see also Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribus 
London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Congress would want to redress harms 
perpetrated abroad which have a substantial impact on investors or markets within the 
United States . . . .” (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 
1968))). 
171. See Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262 (“[C]ourts have been reluctant to apply 
[American] laws to transactions that have only remote and indirect effects in the United 
States.” (citing Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 
1334 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
172. See Banque Paribus, 147 F.3d at 125 (“Congress would want to redress harms 
perpetrated abroad which have a substantial impact on investors or markets within the 
United States . . . .”); Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 (“We believe that Congress intended 
the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic 
investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect 
the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in 
American securities.”). Bersch holds that the effects must be felt by individual investors 
and that “generalized effects” are not sufficient. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 
F.2d 974, 998 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that these generalized effects consisted of a loss of 
investor confidence in the United States, both in the firm at issue and in the regulatory 
system). 
173. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987 (“Congress did not mean the United States to be 
used as a base for fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are 
foreigners . . . .”); Plessey Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 628 F.Supp. 477, 494 (D. Del. 1986) 
(“To prevent the United States from becoming a ‘Barbary Coast’ hospitable to 
international securities ‘pirates’ who defraud investors, the exercise of jurisdiction by 
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effects were actually felt within the United States, as long as the 
requisite conduct was undertaken within the United States.174 
Conduct within the United States must be more than merely 
preparatory to satisfy this test.175 
When the injury is suffered by foreign investors, the conduct 
must also have been directly causal.176 In a Second Circuit case, 
SEC v. Berger, the defendant was a partner of an offshore 
investment fund designed to cater to foreign investors.177 The 
Southern District of New York later found that the fund failed to 
report losses. Berger unsuccessfully appealed the issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction.178 The Second Circuit held that a “scheme 
masterminded and implemented” from within the United States 
met extraterritorial jurisdictional standards, even when the 
relevant false information was disseminated by a foreign entity.179  
Continental Grain Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., a case that dealt 
with a purchase of one firm by another through a stock 
acquisition where the purchased firm defrauded its purchaser,180 
further developed the standard for causality under the conduct 
test. In Continental Grain, the conduct sufficient for jurisdiction 
from within the United States consisted of phone calls and 
mailings from the United States when they were “necessary to 
further the fraudulent scheme.”181 As these examples show, U.S. 
 
American courts must be broad.” (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 
1977))). 
174. See Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 420 (holding that U.S. courts will “examine . . . 
whether defendants conduct in the United States was significant with respect to the 
alleged violation”). 
175. See id. (“[C]onduct in the United States cannot be ‘merely preparatory.’” 
(quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd. 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975))). 
176. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993 (stating that anti-fraud provisions “[d]o not apply to 
losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or 
culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused such losses”); SEC v. 
Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that conduct must be more than 
merely preparatory and directly causal to trigger the conduct test). 
177. See Berger, 322 F.3d at 188 (noting that “Berger, along with two close friends as 
partners, formed an offshore investment company” designed for non-U.S. investors.). 
178. See id. at 190, 196 (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction 
because the “fraud [was] conceived and executed in New York”). 
179. Id. at 193–94 (applying the conduct test to the facts of the case). 
180. Cont’l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 411–12 
(8th Cir. 1979) (discussing the purchase transaction and the issues undisclosed to the 
purchaser). 
181. See id. at 420 (“Defendants conduct in the United States consisted of letters 
and telephone calls which were necessary to further the fraudulent scheme and, in fact, 
constituted the organization and completion of the fraud.”). 
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courts have typically not been squeamish in asserting 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under either the conduct or effect 
tests. 
Bersch, Berger, and Continental Grain deal with harm already 
caused. But unlike private litigants, the SEC is permitted to bring 
suit before an injury has actually been suffered in order to 
prevent foreseeable harm.182 In carrying out its investigations to 
determine which suits to bring, the SEC has certain privileges. 
Any broker registered with the SEC, regardless of whether within 
the United States or not, can be compelled to turn over records 
without a subpoena.183 The SEC can also utilize U.S. courts to 
informally ask a foreign court, to order persons, natural or 
otherwise, within that court’s jurisdiction to disclose documents 
to the SEC or to give testimony.184 Supplementing and enhancing 
its international investigatory powers, the SEC has a range of 
bilateral MOUs. 
2. Requiring Extraterritorial Disclosure 
Once U.S. courts determine personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction, and a trial is underway, other international issues 
may arise. Typically, courts permit fairly liberal discovery for 
entities with relevant documents in overseas jurisdictions.185 U.S. 
 
182. See Berger, 322 F.3d at 193 (“The SEC notes that, unlike private plaintiffs, it 
may bring securities fraud actions prophylactically in order to prevent loss to the public 
before it occurs and to protect the integrity of the stock exchanges . . . .”); Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Unlike private litigants seeking 
damages, the Commission is not required to prove that any investor actually relied on 
the misrepresentations or that the misrepresentations caused any investor to lose 
money.”). 
183. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 890 (“[A] non-resident broker-dealer who is 
registered with the Commission under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act can be 
required to produce its books and records to the SEC without a subpoena.”); SEC, DIV. 
OF TRADING & MKTS, GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION (2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm#VII (listing requirements for 
broker-dealers). 
184. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 891 (“The SEC may also ask U. S. courts to 
send letters of request to foreign judicial authorities asking those authorities to compel 
disclosure and testimony by individuals and companies within their jurisdictions.”); SEC, 
Int’l Enforcement Assistance Site http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_crossborder.shtml [hereinafter SEC Enforcement Site] (listing other enforcement 
mechanisms available to the SEC, including “formal letters rogatory between a U.S. 
court and foreign judicial authorities”). 
185. See Philip O. Erwin, The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 
1990: Increasing International Cooperation in Extraterritorial Discovery?, 15 B.C. INT’L & 
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courts issuing such disclosure orders, however, may come into 
conflict with foreign secrecy and non-disclosure laws—potentially 
putting litigant parties in a position of having to choose between 
violating the court order or breaking foreign law. Even in these 
cases, however, U.S. judges usually require the production of 
documents, unless certain good-faith criteria are met by the party 
claiming impossibility of performance.186 
The 1958 U.S. Supreme Court case Société Internationale v. 
Rogers, in which a Swiss holding company sued the U.S. Attorney 
General to reclaim property improperly seized during World War 
II, first laid out the standards for imposing extraterritorial 
discovery in the face of conflicting foreign laws.187 In this case, 
the trial court had dismissed the suit on the grounds that the 
complaining party had failed to produce required documents in 
Switzerland.188 The decision was appealed on the grounds that 
such production would violate Swiss banking and economic 
espionage laws which carried criminal sanctions, including 
imprisonment, for persons held responsible.189 Around the same 
time, the Swiss authorities, aware of the U.S. suit, interceded to 
confiscate the documents.190 The Court noted that the firm had 
 
COMP. L. REV. 471, 477 (1992) (“In dealing with foreign obstacles to extraterritorial 
discovery, U.S. courts have most often resolved conflicts between domestic and foreign 
law in favor of the former.”); Fisch, supra note 159, at 523 (“Traditionally the United 
States has viewed its jurisdiction expansively and imposed it regulations on transactions 
that may be viewed as essentially foreign.”). 
186. See Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, 
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211–12 (1958) (discussing how plaintiff’s attempts to 
comply with disclosure did not exempt it from disclosure requirements); Erwin, supra 
note 185, at 477 (“The courts have reasoned that the SEC’s need for specific 
information to pursue possible violators of securities laws outweighs the restrictive 
purpose of conflicting foreign law.”). 
187. See Société Internationale, 357 U.S. at 210–12 (spelling out the analysis for 
determining good-faith effort on the part of party compelled to disclose); Erwin, supra 
note 185, at 477–78 (“In Société Internationale, the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of whether sanctions were appropriate where the plaintiff had failed to comply with a 
discovery request for documents on the grounds that doing so would violate Swiss 
banking law.”). 
188. See Société Internationale, 357 U.S. at 201–02 (listing the trial court’s reasoning 
in dismissing the complaint after the failure to produce Swiss documents). 
189. See id. at 204 (“Swiss penal laws did in fact limit petitioner’s ability to satisfy the 
production order because of the criminal sanctions to which those producing the 
records would have been exposed.”). 
190. See id. at 210 (“During this period the Swiss Federal Attorney . . . ‘confiscated’ 
the Sturzenegger records.”). The confiscation amounted to forbidding the transmittal of 
the documents, but the documents themselves were not physically confiscated. See id. at 
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undertaken “extensive efforts” to comply with the order and that 
the firm’s “inability [was] fostered neither by its own conduct nor 
by circumstances within its control.”191 
This focus on good faith was carried forward into later 
decisions by the U.S. circuit courts. In United States v. First 
National City Bank, the defendant corporation appealed a 
decision holding it in contempt after it disclosed subpoenaed 
documents available in the United States, but excluded 
information located in Germany.192 The Second Circuit’s ruling 
in First National City Bank advocated an important role for comity, 
stating that “the mere absence of criminal sanctions abroad 
[does not] necessarily mandate[] obedience to a subpoena.”193 
Instead it was held that courts should work to balance the 
competing interests of the foreign state and the United States, 
even while stating that the U.S. interest in subpoena enforcement 
was particularly strong.194 
A later Second Circuit case involving a kickback scheme 
utilizing foreign bank accounts, United States v. Davis,195 reiterated 
the same concerns: balancing interests, taking into consideration 
strong U.S. interest and possible foreign state intervention, and 
 
200–01 (“This ‘confiscation’ left possession of the records in Sturzenegger and 
amounted to an interdiction on Sturzenegger’s transmission of the records to third 
persons.”). 
191. Id. at 211. 
192. See United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(“Citibank complied with the subpoena insofar as it called for the production of 
material located in New York but failed to produce or divulge any documents reposited 
in Frankfurt.”). 
193. See id. at 902 (“We would be reluctant to hold, however, that the mere absence 
of criminal sanctions abroad necessarily mandates obedience to a subpoena.”). 
194. See id. (“Such a rule would show scant respect for international comity; and, if 
this principle is valid, a court of one country should make an effort to minimize possible 
conflict between its orders and the law of a foreign state affected by its decision.”). In 
this case the fact that neither the United States nor the foreign government had issued 
any kind of statement about the matter and its impact on state relations was held to 
indicate that neither state believed it was a very important matter for their national 
public policies. See id. at 904 (“[I]t is noteworthy that neither the Department of State 
nor the German Government has expressed any view on this case or indicated that, 
under the circumstances present here, enforcement of the subpoena would violate 
German public policy or embarrass German-American relations.”). 
195. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1026 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating the 
scheme “involved the payment of multi-million dollar kickbacks to executives of General 
Dynamics Corporation in return for the approval of subcontracts awarded by General 
Dynamics”). 
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the desire to avoid using foreign laws to shield criminal activity.196 
The Restatement of Foreign Relations proposes that “[w]here 
two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of 
law[,]”197 and the states’ rules are inconsistent, the courts should 
consider: (1) competing interests of the states; (2) the hardship 
imposed on the party; (3) how much conduct must occur in the 
foreign territory; (4) the party’s nationality; and (5) the relation 
between enforcement and the objectives of the applied rule.198 
The U.S. courts’ approach towards extraterritorial 
jurisdiction means that circumstances forcing the courts to refuse 
to hear securities cases with international components are 
narrow, though there are situations in which U.S. courts will not 
always be able to hear cases involving transnational securities 
conduct. Similarly, U.S. courts seem, in general, unimpressed 
with foreign parties’ attempts to escape disclosure obligations 
through foreign secrecy laws, unless fairly stringent good-faith 
requirements are met. 
B. The MOU: Soft Law for a Hard Problem 
The SEC has made extensive use of MOUs and has broad 
powers to facilitate productive MOU arrangements with foreign 
regulators. The Office of International Affairs is an entire 
department within the SEC that deals exclusively with 
international cooperation matters.199 This office sends out over 
500 requests for assistance annually to foreign financial 
regulators and receives around 400 itself.200 The MOU is the 
 
196. See id. at 1035 (stating that courts should “strike a careful balance between the 
competing national interests and the extent to which these interests would be impinged 
upon by the order.”). 
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 40 (1965). 
198. See id. (listing considerations for the imposition of one state’s laws). 
199. See SEC, Office of International Affairs, http://sec.gov/about/offices/
oia.shtml (last modified Jan. 20, 2010) (stating the role of the Office of International 
Affairs as “promot[ing] investor protection and cross-border securities transactions by 
advancing international regulatory and enforcement cooperation, promoting the 
adoption of high regulatory standards worldwide, and formulating technical assistance 
programs to strengthen the regulatory infrastructure in global securities markets.”). 
200. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 892 (“In fiscal year 2008, the staff made 556 
requests to foreign regulators for enforcement assistance and responded to 454 requests 
for foreign assistance from foreign regulators.”); SEC Enforcement Site, supra note 184 
(“In fiscal year 2008, the SEC made 594 requests to foreign authorities for enforcement 
assistance and responded to 414 requests from foreign authorities.”). 
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primary means through which the SEC structures these requests 
and the response procedure.201 
Currently the SEC has MOUs active in over twenty countries, 
though this represents agreements with more than twenty 
regulators.202 The SEC is statutorily authorized to investigate in 
the United States on behalf of foreign regulators, and in doing 
so, may compel testimony or disclosure, even from entities not 
regulated by the SEC.203 The International Securities 
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990 expanded the SEC’s 
powers to include keeping information obtained from foreign 
regulators confidential.204 This includes information received 
through MOUs. 
The SEC’s bilateral MOUs and the MMOU are closely 
related. Like the IOSCO MMOU, bilateral SEC MOUs are not 
binding on the parties.205 The bilateral MOUs’ primary use is 
providing a framework for voluntary cooperation, much like the 
MMOU.206 The similarity is intentional—most MOUs concluded 
by the SEC predate the IOSCO MMOU, and the MMOU was 
 
201. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 892–93 (“These MOUs and cooperative 
arrangements cover most major foreign securities markets.”); Bryan Thomas Shipp, 
Comment, Filling Gaps in European Union Securities Law: Contractually Organized 
Supervision & the College of Euronext Regulators, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 387, 407 (2008) 
(“Cooperation between national securities regulators has traditionally taken place via 
memoranda of understanding (‘MOUs’).”). 
202. See SEC, Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_cooparrangements.shtml (last modified Jan. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter SEC Cooperative Agreements] (listing all MOUs signed by the SEC). For 
example, the U.S.-Canada MOU is more specifically between the SEC, the Ontario 
Securities Commission, the Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec, and the 
British Columbia Securities Commission. See Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.-
Can., Jan. 7, 1988, available at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/
canada.pdf [hereinafter Canada MOU]. 
203. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2009) 
(authorizing the SEC to assist foreign regulators in their investigations). 
204. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
550, 104 Stat. 2713, 2715 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d) (1990)) (creating 
FOIA exemption to ensure confidentiality of exchanges with non-U.S. financial 
regulators). 
205. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 893 (“MOUs and cooperative arrangements 
are generally non-binding agreements.”); Shipp, supra note 201, at 415 (“[N]on-binding 
MOUs facilitate cooperation between regulatory authorities”). 
206. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 892–93 (“[MOUs] in many cases establish 
procedures for sharing informational and providing enforcement assistance.”); see 
Shipp, supra note 201, at 418–19 (“MOUs are generally confined to information sharing 
efforts and do not contemplate actual enforcement.”). 
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modeled on those agreements.207 MOUs concluded by the SEC 
since the implementation of the MMOU in 2002 are considered 
supplementary to its provisions.208 Numerous agreements 
predating the MMOU, however, have remained in effect between 
the SEC and foreign regulators.209  
The MOU’s place within international law, or rather its lack 
thereof, is important to its prospects for effectiveness. As a form 
of soft international law,210 the MOU avoids lengthy treaty 
processes that could involve numerous financial non-experts and 
political machinations; it is also particularly well suited for the 
flexible and quick approach necessary in international securities 
regulation.211 As soft law agreements such as MOUs proliferate, 
however, they can move norms into greater alignment, which 
may culminate in a shift to hard law—either through a treaty or 
an acknowledgement of a customary international law.212  
 
207. See SEC Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (listing all MOUs signed 
since 1987, including ones signed since 2002 with Germany, Switzerland, and Japan). 
208. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 893 (“[T]he SEC currently views bilateral 
agreements as supplementary to the IOSCO multilateral MOU.”); Coop Factsheet, supra 
note 75 (“[T]he SEC considers these bilateral arrangements to be an excellent 
supplement to the information sharing mechanism of the IOSCO MMOU.”). MOUs 
signed since the 2002 MMOU include those with Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. See 
Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (listing all MOUs signed since 1987). 
209. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (showing that the oldest MOU is 
from 1987). 
210. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 884, 913 (“Indeed, the SEC, an 
independent regulatory agency, negotiates and utilizes memoranda of 
understanding . . . which are treaty-like agreements, but are soft law.”); Richard L. 
Williamson, Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some 
Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 63 (2003) (“[S]oft law is nonbinding . . . .”). 
211. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 890–91 (“Neither treaty law nor 
customary international law can provide the speed, flexibility, and expertise that 
international securities regulation requires.”); Williamson, supra note 210, at 63 
(“Diplomats and their governments sometimes prefer concluding soft law instruments 
because doing so can be easier than adopting treaties.”); see also Mahoney, supra note 
168, at 893 (“MOUs and cooperative arrangements are generally non-binding 
agreements . . . .”); Shipp, supra note 201, at 415 (“[N]on-binding MOUs facilitate 
cooperation between regulatory authorities . . . .”). 
212. See Christopher C. Joyner, Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty: 
Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 401, 425 (1998) 
(discussing how soft law ATCM agreement shifted norms regarding Antarctica); Karmel 
& Kelly, supra note 72, at 894, 938 (“Soft law sometimes hardens into binding treaty 
law . . . after soft law moves normative positions far enough that States are willing to 
make a hard law commitment in a form of agreement already recognized as 
constitutionally acceptable.”). 
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Soft law arrangements highlight the fact that cooperation is 
more likely when the benefits of compliance are significant.213 
Parties rely on neither the actual document, nor any 
consequences detailed therein, to secure coordination.214 
Instead, convergent interests make cooperation more likely.215 
The structure of MOUs has not significantly changed since 
they came into existence in the 1980s. They are intended to 
provide a framework for cooperation without forcibly mandating 
that cooperation. Since the SEC’s bilateral MOUs are all very 
similar, examples from each category illustrate those central 
provisions unique to each group. This Note will use the 
Argentine MOU as a representative example of an enforcement 
cooperation MOU; the United Kingdom MOU as representative 
of a regulatory cooperation MOU; and the Egyptian MOU as 
representative of a technical assistance MOU. 
1. Enforcement Cooperation MOUs 
Enforcement cooperation MOUs focus on enforcement 
assistance, though many of their provisions are common to 
MOUs in the other two categories. The MOU between the SEC 
and Argentina’s Comisiόn Nacional de Valores was concluded in 
1991.216 Both parties are expected to assist each other to the full 
extent provided in the MOU, within the bounds of their 
respective domestic constraints.217 Information can be requested 
 
213. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 897 (“[C]ompliance stems less from the 
written agreement and more from the compliance benefits or recognition that the rules 
contained in those treaties are legitimate.”); Williamson, supra note 210, at 74-76 
(outlining circumstances where there is not likely to be a gap in compliance between 
hard and soft law arrangements). 
214. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 897 (“[Soft law] may be developed 
through resolutions, practices, aspirational agreements, and the promulgation of norms 
in various forms that guide behavior.”); Williamson, supra note 210, at 63 (stating that 
soft law avoids domestic legal requirements associated with treaties and other hard law). 
215. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
216. See Memorandum of Understanding On Consultation, Technical Assistance 
and Mutual Assistance for the Exchange of Information, U.S.-Arg., Dec. 9, 1991, available 
at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/argentina.pdf [hereinafter Argentina 
MOU]. 
217. See id. art. III, § 1(1) (“To the extent permitted by the laws and regulations of 
their respective States, the Authorities will provide the fullest measure of mutual 
assistance, as contemplated by this Article.”). When legal constraints are relevant, the 
requested authority is supposed to use “all reasonable efforts” to assist. Id. art. III, § 1(3) 
(“Subject to such limitations of legal authority, the Authorities will use all reasonable 
efforts to obtain the authorization, or the assistance of such other governmental 
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for numerous reasons, including “market oversight functions,” 
“enforcement of the laws or regulations applicable to securities 
markets,” “examination of investment businesses,” and 
“investigations . . . where information [is] located within the 
jurisdiction” of the requested regulator.218 
Under the MOU, the following kinds of assistance, among 
others, may be given by the requested regulator: “(a) providing 
access to information in the files of the requested [regulator]; 
(b) taking testimony and statements of persons; (c) obtaining 
information and documents from persons; and (d) conducting 
compliance inspections or examinations of investment 
businesses, securities processing businesses or securities 
markets.”219  
The Argentine or U.S. regulator can also deny a request for 
assistance: 
(a) where the request would require the requested 
[regulator] to act in a manner that would violate the laws of 
the [s]tate of the requested [regulator]; 
(b) where the request is not in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in this [MOU]; 
(c) on grounds of essential public interest; or 
(d) on grounds of national security.220 
The MOU also creates an obligation to render unsolicited 
assistance when a regulator discovers information that may be 
relevant to the other party-regulator.221 
 
agencies that have such authority, necessary to provide the assistance described in this 
Article.”). 
218. Id. art. III, § 1(1). It does not matter whether the conduct questioned by the 
requesting regulator would constitute a violation within the requested jurisdiction’s laws. 
See id. (“Such assistance will be provided without regard to whether the type of conduct 
described in the request for assistance would constitute a violation of the laws or 
regulations of the State of the requested Authority.”). However, if the requesting 
jurisdiction’s laws specify that the target of an investigation be given access to counsel, 
the requested regulator must attempt to provide counsel in its own investigations on the 
behalf of the requesting regulator. See id. art. III, § 4(7)(b) (stating that if “the laws of 
the State of the requesting Authority require the opportunity for counsel . . . the 
requested Authority will use its best efforts to ensure that such an opportunity will be 
given.”). 
219. Id. art. III, § 1(2). 
220. Id. art. III, § 2(4). 
221. See id. art. III, § 8 (“To the extent permitted by the laws or regulations of their 
respective States, each Authority will use reasonable efforts to provide the other 
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There are restrictions on information obtained through an 
MOU request. The information may only be used by the 
requesting regulator for the purposes specified in the request.222 
The requested regulator must be given an opportunity to object 
to any unstipulated uses.223 Regulators are expected to keep 
requests and their outcomes confidential, as permitted by their 
respective domestic laws.224 When a regulator is forced to disclose 
such information pursuant to its domestic law, it must notify the 
other regulator and attempt to exempt itself from disclosure.225 
Other MOUs are very similar. For example, the MOU 
between the SEC and three Canadian provincial regulators also 
states that the regulators will “provide the fullest mutual 
assistance, as contemplated” by the MOU.226 It does not, 
however, contain compliance inspections of financial entities as 
available assistance between regulators.227 In 1986 the SEC 
 
Authority with any information it discovers that gives rise to a suspicion of a breach, or 
anticipated breach, of the laws or regulations of the State of the other Authority.”). 
222. See id. art. III, § 5(1) (“The requesting Authority may use the information 
furnished solely: (a) for the purposes stated in the request . . . .”). 
223. See id. art. III, § 5(2) (“In order to use the information furnished for any 
purpose other than those stated in paragraph 1 of this Section, the requesting Authority 
will first notify the requested Authority of its intention and provide it the opportunity to 
oppose such use.”). 
224. See id. art. III, § 6(1) (“Except as contemplated by Section 5 of this Article, the 
requesting Authority will not offer the information to, and shall use its best efforts to 
ensure that it is not obtained by, any other person.”); see also International Securities 
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990 [ISECA], Pub. L. No. 101-550, § 202, 104 Stat. 
2713, 2715–16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)(allowing the 
SEC to keep information obtained from foreign regulators confidential). Congress 
created a specific disclosure exception for information obtained through memoranda of 
understanding. See id. (allowing the SEC to keep information obtained from foreign 
regulators confidential); see also 15 U.S.C. 78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (codifying part of 
ISECA, specifying MOUs as valid vehicles for obtaining information that may be kept 
confidential). 
225. See Argentina MOU, supra note 216, art. III, § 6(3) (“The requesting Authority 
will notify the requested Authority of any legally enforceable demand for information 
prior to complying with the demand, and will assert such appropriate legal exemptions 
or privileges with respect to such information as may be available.”). 
226. Canada MOU, supra note 202, art. II, § 1. 
227. See id. (failing to contain a provision to this effect). It is possible that this 
measure was omitted from the U.S.-Canada agreement because it was an earlier 
agreement. Alternatively, the SEC might have been concerned about the ineffectiveness 
of the Argentine regulator when including the provision. The U.S.-Norway MOU was 
also a later-concluded MOU and includes such a provision. See Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the Administration and 
Enforcement of Securities Laws, art. III § 1(1), U.S.-Nor., Sep. 24, 1991, available at 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/norway.pdf (“The Authorities will 
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concluded an MOU with the Securities Bureau of the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance.228 This document is surprisingly short, with 
the parties agreeing only to “facilitate each [regulator]’s 
respective requests for surveillance and investigatory information 
on a case-by-case basis.”229 However, a later supplementary 
Statement of Intent from 2002 is largely similar to other bilateral 
SEC MOUs.230 Other regulators with whom the SEC has signed 
MOUs closely reflecting these core provisions include Israel, the 
Jersey Isles, Mexico, Norway, and Portugal.231 
2. Regulatory Cooperation MOUs 
Regulatory cooperation MOUs spotlight communication for 
both enforcement purposes and general developments relevant 
to regulators. The MOU between the SEC and the FSA discusses 
areas of cooperation with a focus on general regulator 
considerations.232 The change in focus can in part be accounted 
for by the fact that it was implemented after the development of 
IOSCO’s MMOU.233 This MOU is therefore seen as a 
 
provide the fullest mutual assistance within the framework of this Memorandum of 
Understanding. Such assistance will be provided to facilitate the enforcement of the laws 
or regulations applicable to securities markets and their members; . . . [and] the 
inspection or examination of investment businesses . . . .”). 
228. See Understanding on the Sharing of Information, U.S.-Japan, May 13, 1986, 
available at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/japan.pdf. 
229. Id. 
230. See Statement of Intent Concerning Cooperation, Consultation and the 
Exchange of Information, U.S.-Japan, May 17, 2002, available at http://sec.gov/about/
offices/oia/oia_bilateral/japan.pdf. 
231. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (showing all MOUs signed by SEC 
and their actual texts, including those with Israel, the Jersey Isles, Norway, and 
Portugal); see also Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation, 
Consultation and the Exchange of Information, U.S.-Jersey, May 22, 2002, available at 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/jersey.pdf [hereinafter Jersey MOU] 
(containing many similar provisions to the Supplementary MOU between the Japanese 
and the SEC). 
232. See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation 
and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervision of 
Financial Services Firms, ¶ 19, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_multilateral/ukfsa_mou.pdf (“The Authorities recognize the 
importance of close communication concerning the global operations of Firms, and 
intend to consult regularly regarding general supervisory developments and issues 
relevant to the operations, activities and regulation of such Firms.”). 
233. See id. ¶ 15 (“This MOU is intended to complement, but does not alter the 
terms and conditions of the following existing arrangements concerning cooperation in 
securities matters: . . . (ii) the IOSCO [MMOU], to which the SEC and FSA are 
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complement to the MMOU (and other previous cooperative 
agreements).234 The two regulators undertake to: 
inform [each] other . . . in advance of: a) pending regulatory 
changes that may have a significant impact on the 
operations, activities or reputation of a [f]irm, in the other 
jurisdiction; and b) any material event that could adversely 
impact each other’s markets or the stability of a [f]irm, in 
the other jurisdiction . . . .235 
Each regulator also has the authority to conduct on-site visits with 
companies that are either headquartered within either 
regulators’ jurisdiction or regulated by both.236 
Other MOUs concluded by the SEC explicitly state that they 
are supplementary to the MMOU. The regulatory cooperation 
MOU between the SEC and Germany’s Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) is one example.237 In fact, it is 
largely identical to the FSA agreement.238 
Bilateral agreements do not have to take the form of a full 
MOU. Beyond their general MOU, German and U.S. regulators 
have concluded a more specific supplementary agreement 
dealing with the merger and subsequent oversight of German 
and U.S. securities exchange holding companies.239 The 
document states that “joint ownership . . . of [m]arkets alone will 
 
signatories, which also covers information-sharing in the context of enforcement 
investigations.”). 
234. See id. 
235. Id. ¶ 20. 
236. See id. ¶ 23 (listing requirements for on-site visits). The regulator must notify 
the “Host [Regulator]” before such a visit. Id. ¶ 24(a) (requiring the lnspecting 
Authority to “notify the Host Authority of its intent to conduct an On-Site Visit”). 
237. See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation 
and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervision of 
Financial Services Firms, ¶ 16, U.S.-F.R.G., Apr. 26, 2007, available at http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/germany_regcoop.pdf (“This MOU is intended to 
complement, but does not alter the terms and conditions of the following existing 
arrangements concerning cooperation in securities matters: . . . (ii) the IOSCO 
[MMOU], to which the SEC and BaFin are signatories, which also covers information-
sharing in the context of enforcement investigations.”). 
238. See id. arts. 1–8 (containing similar provisions to the SEC-FSA MOU). 
239. See Arrangement for Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information Relating to the Oversight of Affiliated Markets Made under the Supervisory 
MOU between the US SEC and the German BaFin, U.S.-F.R.G., Apr. 26, 2007, available 
at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/germany_bafin.pdf (stating more 
specific provisions, but also incorporating sections of the original MOU between BaFin 
and SEC). 
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not lead to mandatory registration of, or application of domestic 
laws to, a [m]arket in another [regulator]’s jurisdiction or 
companies listed on that [m]arket.”240 In addition, the heads of 
the regulators agree to regularly meet in person in order to share 
concerns specifically about the integration of the exchanges.241 
Should the merged exchanges decide to harmonize their 
internal rules, the regulators commit to “coordinate their 
regulatory approval processes and . . . facilitate the development 
and implementation of consistent rules.”242 The Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission and the SEC have also issued an accord 
concerning the same merger, as the German holding company is 
itself held by a Swiss firm.243 
3. Technical Assistance MOUs 
Technical assistance MOUs focus on helping developing 
financial centers promulgate rules and create useful regulatory 
frameworks for their nascent markets. In 1996 the Egyptian 
Capital Market Authority and the SEC signed an MOU oriented 
towards aiding the development of Egyptian financial markets.244 
This MOU briefly mentions enforcement cooperation and 
contains a provision about periodic consultations “about subjects 
of mutual interest and issues facing their respective markets.”245 
The SEC also commits in the agreement to advise on: (1) “[l]aws 
and regulations to protect investors;” (2) “[s]tandards for 
offering securities;” (3) “[m]arket oversight and enforcement 
 
240. Id. ¶ 10. 
241. See id. ¶ 13 (“The Chairmen of the SEC, BaFin and ESA intend to meet 
periodically to identify and discuss issues of regulatory concern to one or more 
Authorities, and to identify and discuss at early stages the regulatory implications of 
anticipated further levels of integration of the Markets.”). 
242. Id. ¶ 16. 
243. See Undertaking Relating to the Oversight of Affiliated Markets between the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission, U.S.-Switz., Apr. 30, 2007, available at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_bilateral/switzerland_sfbc.pdf (describing the ownership structure of the entities 
involved). 
244. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Exchange of Information, 
Consultation and Technical Assistance, U.S.-Egypt, Feb. 11, 1996, available at 
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/egypt.pdf (stating the desire between 
the parties to “establish a framework for cooperation in the enforcement of the 
securities laws of the United States and Egypt and the provision of technical assistance to 
facilitate the development of the Egyptian markets”). 
245. Id. art. I. 
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mechanisms;” and (4) “[s]ystems of supervision.”246 The SEC-
Russian Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital 
Market MOU expands these areas of advice and assistance and 
includes, as topics for advisement infrastructure of markets, 
“accounting and auditing principles” and educational programs 
for Russian government officials.247 Technical assistance MOUs 
have targeted states whose financial markets are beginning to 
develop and which could use the guidance and support of 
experienced regulators like the SEC. 
C. The MOU as a Cooperative Framework 
Hypothetical scenarios constructed by political theorists, 
also known as simple game models, are useful in evaluating 
MOUs as cooperative framework tools. The interactions arranged 
for by MOUs at first glance resemble the simple game model 
called the prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma, two 
actors each independently and simultaneously decide whether to 
cooperate or not cooperate (also termed “defect”) with each 
other.248 These interactions take place in a system of anarchy, 
meaning that repercussions for defecting actors are limited to 
acts by the other actor.249 Each actor’s ultimate payoff from each 
 
246. Id. art. II. 
247. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Technical Cooperation, Mutual 
Assistance and Consultation, ¶ 4., U.S.-Russ., Dec. 6, 1995, available at http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/russia.pdf. (expanding upon the Egyptian-U.S. MOU). 
Several other regulators, including the Securities and Exchange Board of India, have 
technical cooperation agreements with the SEC. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note 
202 (listing all technical cooperation MOUs that the SEC has signed, including with 
India). 
248. See generally Stephen J. Majeski & Shane Fricks, Conflict and Cooperation in 
International Relations, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 622, 623 (1995) (discussing the prisoner’s 
dilemma and variations); R. Harrison Wagner, The Theory of Games and the Problem of 
International Cooperation, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 330, 330–32 (1983). The requirement of 
simultaneous decision-making is more appropriate here than in other circumstances as 
it is easy to imagine that at any time, a foreign regulator and the SEC have information 
requests pending with each other. See supra note 200 (noting the large number of 
requests the SEC makes and deals with annually). 
249. See Joseph M. Grieco, Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: 
Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, 50 J. POL. 600, 613 (1988) (“[T]he 
anarchical context within which the states are operating is likely to induce a very high 
level of caution in each.”); Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 622–23 (explaining that 
the assumption of anarchy in the international system means that states’ options are 
constrained by the actions of other states). 
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decision responds to the simultaneous decision of the other.250 
The highest payoff available to an actor occurs if he defects while 
his partner cooperates; the next highest payoff results from 
mutual cooperation.251 A second-worst outcome is reached when 
both actors defect. The least desirable outcome is for the actor to 
cooperate while his partner defects.252 
In an international securities enforcement environment, an 
example of the most preferred prisoner’s dilemma outcome for a 
foreign regulator would be if the SEC cooperated with the terms 
of the relevant MOU by responding favorably to an information 
request, and in turn the foreign regulator defected by denying 
assistance to the SEC in contravention of the terms of the MOU. 
In this way, the foreign regulator would be able to accumulate 
information on securities issues within its own jurisdiction, while 
reducing the likelihood that firms and individuals within its own 
jurisdiction will get in trouble for violating another state’s 
securities laws. The assumption of anarchy is perhaps more 
relevant here than in other international situations, since MOUs 
are not binding and dispute resolution procedures are limited to 
the parties “engag[ing] in consultation . . . in the event of . . . a 
denial by one [regulator]” of an information request.253 
However, this is not as troublesome for the prospects of 
cooperation as it might seem. 
A deeper examination of the structure and operations of 
particular MOUs reveals that this outcome is not likely. The 
 
250. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 622–23 (explaining that the 
assumption of anarchy in the international system means that states’ options are 
constrained by the actions of other states); Wagner, supra note 248, at 330 (describing 
different models, including the prisoner’s dilemma, and how states’ payoffs are 
structured). 
251. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 623 (“The logic of the game dictates 
that it is individually rational for both players to defect . . . .”); Wagner, supra note 248, 
at 330 (“First, [the prisoner’s dilemma] illustrates the general point that equilibrium 
outcomes in noncooperative games can be sub-optimal.”). 
252. See supra note 251 (discussing the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma). 
253. Argentina MOU, supra note 216, art. 3, § 7. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 
893 (“MOUs and cooperative arrangements are generally non-binding agreements that 
state the parties’ intent to exchange information and cooperate in securities violation 
investigations.”). Although there are no official repercussions for defection, securities 
regulators are agents of their larger state governments. As such, their costs and benefits 
from either cooperating or defecting may be influenced by the attitude and policies of 
their national governments. See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text (discussing 
larger political pressures exerted on government agencies). 
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prisoner’s dilemma model has two critical shortfalls in accurately 
predicting the interactions between regulators governed by an 
SEC MOU. First, it does not consider the possibilities for 
communication between the two regulators. Frequent 
communication, in particular, “cheap talk,” or nonbinding 
communications used to hammer out differences and voice 
concerns, greatly increases the odds of successful mutual 
cooperation.254 The MOU itself is a framework designed to 
facilitate just this kind of cooperation. In fact, Michael Mann, 
former director of the SEC’s Office of International Affairs, 
stated that one of the most significant side-benefits of an MOU is 
that it promotes a personal relationship between the regulators 
within the SEC and those within foreign regulatory agencies.255 
This greatly enhances communication. 
Second, the simple prisoner’s dilemma model contemplates 
only one iteration of the game, but in practice MOUs are 
exercised repeatedly and often.256 Multiple iterations of an 
interaction increase the likelihood of cooperation, since a 
regulator knows that its own defection this time around will 
incite retaliatory defection by its counter-party the next time 
around.257 Relating this back to the original structure of the 
 
254. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 625 (stating that the “second form of 
communication labeled cheap talk is costless”); Wagner, supra note 248, at 338 (“If 
player 2 can decide more than simply whether to cooperate or defect, but can also 
develop and communicate to player 1 a variety of retaliatory choices that influence 
either or both a1 and a2, then player 2 confronts an additional decision problem.”). 
Effective communication also allows the two regulators to bargain over the terms of 
compliance and information sharing, which should result in a higher probability of 
success in any scenario, but particularly ones where one of the regulators is facing 
conditions that might induce it to not cooperate. See Grieco, supra note 249, at 618 
(discussing how Tokyo Round outcomes were affected by bargaining (communication) 
between actors); Wagner, supra note 248, at 342 (“Selection of one agreement over 
another [by actors] must . . . be the result of bargaining.”). 
255. See Telephone Interview with Michael Mann, Former Dir., Office of Int’l 
Affairs, SEC (Oct. 28, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mann Interview] (stating 
that a significant side-benefit of an MOU is that it promotes a personal relationship 
between the regulators within the SEC and those within foreign regulators). 
256. See supra notes 168–200 and accompanying text; SEC, IN BRIEF FY 2011 
CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 24 (2010) (listing requests between the SEC and foreign 
regulators for enforcement assistance during the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 
2009). 
257. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 639 (“Not surprisingly, groups also 
achieve mutual cooperative lock-in (defined as a situation in which mutual cooperation 
is sustained from the nth iteration of the game through the final iteration of the game) 
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prisoner’s dilemma, a foreign regulator defecting in an 
interaction with the SEC may achieve the foreign regulator’s 
most preferred outcome in the first iteration, but in the second 
iteration will almost certainly realize the second worst payoff, or 
even the worst payoff if the foreign regulator attempts to 
cooperate while the SEC defects. By locking in to a cycle of 
cooperation, the foreign regulator can ensure at least its second 
most preferred outcome, mutual cooperation.258 
Considering that MOUs promote communication and 
contemplate iterated interactions, their prospects for success in 
prompting cooperation within the prisoner’s dilemma 
framework seem high. 
D. Non-U.S. MOUs 
Other states’ regulators have signed MOUs among 
themselves. For example, China’s Securities Regulatory 
Commission has been particularly active in promulgating 
MOUs.259 The Chinese regulator has MOUs with most of the 
major developed states and even Taiwan.260 India’s Securities and 
Exchange Board has also been creating MOUs, recently signing 
one with Dubai’s regulator.261 Other countries’ use of MOUs 
 
more often when they can communicate.”); Wagner, supra note 248, at 333 (discussing 
indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemma). 
258. See supra note 257 and accompanying text; Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 
639; Wagner, supra note 248, at 333 (observing that the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
changes optimal strategies). This view of a regulator’s preferences may be overly cynical, 
but a general ethos of effective enforcement for all probably spurs a large part of 
cooperation. See Mann Interview, supra note 255 (explaining actual regulator 
motivations behind cooperation). 
259. See Checklist of the Memoranda between the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the Overseas Regulatory Commissions, http://old.csrc.gov.cn/
n575458/n4001948/n4002030/4079126.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (listing all 
MOUs signed by Chinese regulators). 
260. See id.; Taiwan, China Seal Financial MOU, CHINA POST (Taipei), Nov. 17, 2009, 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2009/11/17/233003/
Taiwan-China.htm (“The memorandum of understanding (MOU) on cooperation in 
financial supervision across the Taiwan Strait was officially signed yesterday . . . .”). 
261. See Sebi Inks MoU with Dubai Regulatory Agency, TIMES OF INDIA (Mumbai), Oct. 
28, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/biz/india-business/Sebi-inks-MoU-with-
Dubai-regulatory-agency-/articleshow/5173121.cms (“Market regulator Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on Wednesday signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) with Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for bi-lateral 
assistance and mutual cooperation.”); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Bd. of India, Sebi 
Signs MOU with DFSA, Dubai, PR No.325/2009 (Oct. 28, 2009), available at 
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speaks to the effectiveness of the form in encouraging 
meaningful cooperation. 
E. The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act 
The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act 
(“ISECA”) was passed in 1990 in order to “strengthen 
international cooperation in the enforcement of securities laws 
and thereby enhance the ability of the [SEC] to prevent and 
detect violations of US securities laws that are committed at least 
in part abroad and whose investigation may require the [SEC] to 
obtain substantial foreign-based evidence.”262 The Act greatly 
increased the ability of the SEC to keep information obtained 
from foreign regulators confidential by creating a Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) exemption.263 Specifically, the FOIA 
exemption applies to information obtained through an MOU 
when, as ISECA states, “the foreign securities authority has in 
good faith determined and represented to the [SEC] that public 
disclosure of such records would violate the laws applicable to 
that foreign securities authority.”264 By expanding FOIA 
exceptions through ISECA to include MOU-obtained documents, 
Congress gave the SEC an effective and helpful backdoor 
approach to getting the information it needs to conduct its 
 
http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=SubSection&sec_id=25&sub_sec_id=25 
(“Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) today signed a bi-lateral 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Dubai Financial Services Authority 
(DFSA) on assistance and mutual cooperation.”). 
262. H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 (stating 
that a goal of ISECA is to “strengthen international cooperation in the enforcement of 
securities laws and thereby enhance the ability of the [SEC] to prevent and detect 
violations of United States securities laws that are committed at least in part abroad and 
whose investigation may require the [SEC] to obtain substantial foreign-based 
evidence”). 
263. See id. at 21; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (describing the FOIA 
exemption in ISECA for exchanges with foreign financial regulators). Before the 
exemption, the SEC found obtaining documents from foreign regulators covered by 
foreign confidentiality provisions very difficult and often impossible. See H.R. REP. NO. 
101-240, at 21 (“The Commission cannot provide assurances of confidentiality because 
of its disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (‘FOIA’) or pursuant 
to a third party subpoena” and the resultant harm to cooperative efforts); Jimenez, supra 
note 64, at 298 (“In many cases, foreign secrecy laws and blocking statutes have 
hampered SEC attempts to obtain witnesses and documentary evidence from abroad.”). 
264. International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-550, title II, sec. 202, § 24, 104 Stat. 2713, 2715 (1990) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78x(d)(1) (2007)). 
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investigations. Although U.S. courts have not been squeamish 
about asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, bringing a party to 
trial has not proven a guarantee of complete disclosure. If a party 
is able to demonstrate good faith efforts to produce the required 
information, or if the other state’s interest is deemed 
overridingly important, the party may avoid having to reveal the 
information. 
Although nonbinding, coinciding regulator interests should 
serve to render MOUs effective. This is especially true 
considering the provisions giving regulators the option of not 
complying when doing so would violate their domestic laws. 
MOUs’ general wording creates a framework for cooperation 
that responds to these parallel interests and gives regulators the 
flexibility to be comfortable agreeing to an MOU. 
III. IMPROVED INVESTIGATION AT THE EXPENSE OF 
DISCLOSURE 
The SEC has used MOUs to effectively increase information 
gathering through cooperation with foreign regulators. This 
success comes in part from appropriate structuring as a soft-law 
arrangement between individual regulators.265 MOUs are not 
negotiated by the two regulators’ respective governments, but are 
instead developed and signed by the regulators themselves.266 
Unfortunately, significant study into the SEC’s actual requests 
made pursuant to its MOUs, and the outcomes of those requests, 
is hampered by FOIA exceptions created by Congress specifically 
to improve the effectiveness of MOUs.267 
Part III.A compiles the evidence that MOUs are effective 
tools in promoting regulator cooperation. Part III.B suggests that 
soft-law arrangements, like the SEC’s MOUs, are better suited to 
inter-regulator coordinative arrangements than harder law. Part 
III.C discusses the FOIA exception to disclosure of information 
obtained through MOUs and how that exception impedes 
meaningful information gathering about the SEC’s activities and 
outcomes through MOUs. 
 
265. See supra Part II.B (discussing soft law arrangements). 
266. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing regulators’ independence in signing MOUs). 
267. See § 202, 104. Stat. at 2715 (describing the FOIA exemption in ISECA for 
exchanges with foreign financial regulators). 
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A. MOUs Promote Cooperation 
MOUs catalyze transnational interactions between 
regulators.268 Although MOUs are not binding arrangements 
purporting to require regulators to share information, they do 
prime regulators to cooperate.269 By establishing procedures and 
limits for information requests, and by promoting personal and 
institutional relationships between regulators, the SEC’s MOUs 
ensure that foreign regulating bodies know both what to expect 
from the SEC and how they are expected to handle a response.270 
As an agreement designed to facilitate communication, an 
MOU can increase the possibilities of coordination between the 
SEC and other party regulators.271 The SEC’s first MOU greatly 
enhanced SEC access to Swiss records, even before the 
confidentiality provisions in ISECA were passed.272 The fact that 
information requests are typically not denied is a testament to 
the effectiveness of the MOU framework. Such success is also a 
result of an awareness within the SEC of which foreign records 
will remain undisclosed under foreign securities laws, even 
considering ISECA’s confidentiality stipulations.273 According to 
Michael Mann, a convergence on the norm of enforcement, even 
if the states and regulators disagree on the specific details, may 
 
268. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 893 (stating MOUs’ effect as “sharing 
information and providing enforcement assistance in where [sic] key evidence exists 
outside of the United States’ borders”); Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that 
MOUs promote interpersonal relationships between regulators and prepare them to 
cooperate). 
269. See Jimenez, supra note 64, at 305 (“MOU’s are merely statements of intent.”); 
Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that MOUs promote interpersonal relationships 
between regulators and prepare them to cooperate). 
270. See Jimenez, supra note 64, at 306 (detailing advantages of MOUs from the 
SEC’s viewpoint); Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that regulators know what to 
expect in cooperation structured through MOUs). 
271. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 624 (“One additional way to help 
account for the unexpected presence of cooperation in international politics may be 
found by enriching the neorealist theory of international relations and its attendant 
game-theoretic formalisms to include communication.”); Wagner, supra note 248, at 338 
(“If player 2 can decide more than simply whether to cooperate or defect, but can also 
develop and communicate to player 1 a variety of retaliatory choices that influence 
either or both a, and a2, then player 2 confronts an additional decision problem . . . .”). 
272. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 
(stating the significant benefits from the 1982 MOU between the SEC and Swiss 
regulator). 
273. See Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that denials are uncommon 
because regulators can reasonably anticipate responses). 
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also be contributing to the success of the MOU system.274 Perhaps 
the greatest available evidence of the effectiveness of the MOU 
framework regime is the promulgation of IOSCO and the 
MMOU and the fact that the SEC has continued to sign 
supplementary bilateral MOUs after the 2002 acceptance of the 
MMOU.275 Other states’ use of MOUs supports this position.276 
Taken all together, the growing use of MOUs suggests that the 
agreements must be significantly useful in aiding the SEC’s 
international investigations. 
B. Softer Law is Valuable 
The flexibility provided by soft law arrangements is 
advantageous to the parties involved in an SEC MOU. The option 
to withdraw from the agreement without consequence, when 
coupled with effective communication, tends to enhance 
cooperative prospects.277 The nature of MOUs does not 
necessarily require hard-law codification in any case. As purely 
procedure oriented, information-sharing agreements that take 
into account the particular sensitivities of foreign securities laws 
through their own exemptions to disclosure and ISECA,278 MOUs 
already seem particularly disposed to success. A hard-law 
agreement between governments does not offer anything not 
already putatively accomplished by MOUs. 
In fact, a binding treaty obligation between the United 
States and another state on behalf of their regulators could face 
problems. Government agencies responsible for diplomatic 
relations almost certainly have different objectives than securities 
regulators, as their political mandate differs. In addition, any 
binding treaty agreement runs the risk of reducing both 
 
274. See id. (stating that regulators want to cooperate). 
275. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (listing all of the SEC’s MOUs 
including those signed after 2002); About IOSCO, supra note 63 (reviewing the activities 
of IOSCO). 
276. See supra notes 259–261 (discussing MOUs between foreign regulators). 
277. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 890–91 (explaining speed and flexibility 
benefits of soft law); Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 637 (“By providing a safe and 
more valuable option, the withdrawal choice also reduces defection without eroding 
cooperation to any significant degree.”). 
278. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, title II, sec. 202, § 
24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16 amending 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (describing the FOIA exemption in ISECA for exchanges with 
foreign financial regulators). 
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flexibility and the ability of the SEC to deal with foreign 
regulators on a case-by-case basis. 
C. A Confidentiality Roadblock 
ISECA’s FOIA exception for documents obtained through 
MOUs certainly has made cooperation between the SEC and 
non-U.S. regulators more feasible.279 As the FOIA exemption 
states, records obtained from foreign regulators are only covered 
if the foreign regulator determines in good faith that disclosure 
would violate its own confidentiality laws and conveys that 
information to the SEC.280 MOUs are drafted to respond to this 
power regarding confidentiality. For example, a typical SEC 
MOU, signed around the same time as the MMOU came into 
effect, provides that “[t]o the extent possible, the [r]equesting 
[regulator] will notify the [r]equested [regulator] of any legally 
enforceable demand for non-public information furnished under 
this [MOU] prior to compliance, and the [r]equested 
[regulator] will assert such appropriate legal exemptions or 
privileges with respect to such information as may be 
available.”281 
Under this MOU framework, when the SEC receives a FOIA 
request for information obtained from a foreign regulator, the 
SEC should notify the foreign regulator of the request.282 The 
foreign regulator then, in good faith, determines if the records 
are subject to confidentiality provisions within their own 
jurisdiction. That regulator then conveys that information to the 
 
279. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 23 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 
(“[U]nless an appropriate FOIA exemption is created, foreign securities authorities will 
refuse to enter into MOUs with the [SEC].”). 
280. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, title II, sec. 202, § 
24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16 amending 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (describing the FOIA exemption in ISECA for exchanges with 
foreign financial regulators). 
281. Compare Jersey MOU, supra note 231, ¶ 16(c) (“To the extent possible, the 
Requesting Authority will notify the Requested Authority of any legally enforceable 
demand for non-public information furnished under this Memorandum of 
Understanding prior to compliance, and the Requested Authority will assert such 
appropriate legal exemptions or privileges with respect to such information as may be 
available.”), with Argentina MOU, supra note 216, at art. III, § 6(3) (“The requesting 
Authority will notify the requested Authority of any legally enforceable demand for 
information prior to complying with the demand, and will assert such appropriate legal 
exemptions or privileges with respect to such information as may be available.”). 
282. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
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SEC, which in turn articulates that reason for withholding the 
documents. 
The non-binding nature of MOUs means that the SEC may 
disclose as it chooses, though this would significantly hamper 
future efforts to coordinate. According to the statute, the only 
circumstances under which the SEC must disclose information 
obtained from foreign regulators under an MOU is either when a 
court orders it, but only if the underlying suit was instituted by 
the U.S. government or the SEC, or when Congress demands 
it.283  
The determination made by the foreign regulator must be 
in good faith; however, the SEC has stated that it assumes all 
assertions made by the foreign party to be in good faith, unless 
indications say otherwise.284 Foreign regulators are barred from 
making sweeping determinations about confidentiality.285 
Instead, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis.286 
In 1989, while contemplating ISECA, Congress seemed 
receptive to arguments for expanding the reach of the FOIA 
exemption beyond the SEC’s proposal.287 However, the SEC 
defended the initial proposal, which was ultimately the one 
included in the bill.288 As international investigations have 
become more important in the two decades since ISECA was 
passed, the FOIA exemption for MOU-obtained documents has 
 
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 78x(e)(2) (2007) (stating that the FOIA exception does not 
apply if the records are requested by Congress or by the court in a proceeding if 
instituted by the SEC). Thus, the information is protected from disclosure in a suit by 
private parties. See id. (stating that the FOIA exception does not apply if the records are 
requested by Congress or the court if in a proceeding instituted by the SEC). 
284. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 
(explaining the importance of good faith in confidentiality determinations by the 
foreign regulator). 
285. See id. 
286. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d)(1) (2007) (stating “the foreign securities authority has in 
good faith determined and represented to the Commission that public disclosure of 
such records would violate the laws applicable to that foreign securities authority . . . .”). 
287. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 
(showing that Congressman Rinaldo asked whether the exemption should be made 
“more broad”). 
288. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, title II, sec. 202, § 
24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16 (1990) (stating that “the Commission shall not be 
compelled to disclose records obtained from a foreign securities authority”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-240, at 34 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 (“The proposed 
exemption would establish a clear standard for nondisclosure: whether the information 
is protected by applicable foreign law.”). 
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become increasingly relevant. It may be operating to exclude a 
growing body of significant information from parties facing 
investigation and possible prosecution by the SEC. The 
exemption also shields the SEC’s international interactions from 
meaningful public examination. Although the exemption is 
clearly necessary to satisfy the interests of confidentiality, without 
which the existence of cooperation would be questionable, a new 
balance may need to be struck. The democratic values enshrined 
and promoted within FOIA warrant a reconsideration of the 
extent of these confidentiality provisions, especially considering 
the overlap with enforcement exemptions also available under 
FOIA. 
CONCLUSION 
The financial centrality of the United States is eroding as 
other states begin to catch up developmentally and 
technologically. Coinciding with the first clear signs of this U.S. 
decline—beginning in the 1980s and steadily growing in 
importance—MOUs allow the SEC to increase information 
sharing with other regulators in order to combat growing 
opportunities for foreign misconduct. As frameworks for 
international cooperation, MOUs hold the promise of 
successfully promoting cooperation. This is especially the case 
considering the changes in the global financial market structure 
and how these changes affect the prospects and arrangement of 
successful cooperation. MOUs prime regulators to exchange 
information in expected ways. Their soft law structure allows 
them to embody the flexible and timely approach desirable in 
securities regulation. 
In the United States, however, the FOIA exception has 
served to remove many actual operations of MOUs from public 
scrutiny. As an important vehicle for the SEC to exchange 
information with foreign regulators, an activity growing rapidly in 
importance, a more meaningful and deep review into MOUs’ 
operation and true effectiveness is certainly in order. Until a 
study is concluded by a body with the power to compel the 
necessary disclosure, namely Congress, other factors will have to 
suffice in determining the effectiveness of MOUs. The SEC’s 
ambitious actions against foreign fraud and other violations and 
its enthusiastic continued support for MOUs clearly demonstrate 
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their ability to foster cooperation and enhance transnational 
enforcement. 
Although the U.S. Congress, in consultation with the SEC, 
ultimately left the extent of the FOIA exception at the level the 
SEC proposed, that level seems increasingly onerous. 
Investigations into transnational conduct are increasingly 
common, and responding to that conduct is correspondingly 
more important. Admirable and important democratic values are 
enshrined within the ethos that underlies FOIA; but exceptions 
are warranted in balancing those values with the other goals and 
responsibilities faced by society and government. 
The FOIA exception operates to impose other states’ 
domestic confidentiality laws on to investigations and 
information gathered by the SEC, sometimes in pursuit of 
prosecuting U.S. citizens. However, the justifications are 
reasonable and valid. The information itself is being surrendered 
by foreign governments, or at least their agencies. In the interest 
of meaningful justice, subjecting that information to 
confidentiality restrictions is reasonable if a condition of the 
information’s release is its confidentiality. This was Congress’ 
intention in passing the FOIA exception. The effect, as intended, 
has been to create fewer “information havens” for suspect 
individuals either operating from within the United States or 
having effects on U.S. citizens. 
Important justifications aside, the growing use and 
importance of information obtained through MOUs, including 
the IOSCO MMOU, mean that a progressively larger amount of 
information used by the SEC in investigating U.S. citizens with 
connections or interests abroad is confidential. This 
confidentiality extends beyond the conclusion of an 
investigation, even if charges are never pursued. It is incumbent 
upon those with access to the information—Congress and the 
SEC—to make the effectiveness of MOUs and the impact of their 
resulting information public in a way that does not unreasonably 
impair the relevant confidentiality provisions or enforcement of 
U.S. securities laws. 
